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Charitable giving is big business. In 2009, the Internal Revenue Service 
reported close to I 00, 000 private foundations, almost double the number from 
fifteen years earlier. Some of these charitable trusts, like the Gates 
Foundation, are multi-billion dollar enterprises. Trust instruments and other 
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governing documents set forth the terms that control these gifts. Because 
charitable trusts can exist in perpetuity, however, changing circumstances 
sometimes render the terms difficult to fulfill. Courts can apply cy pres, a 
doctrine that allows for the modification of gift restrictions, but in the past 
courts have tended to apply cy pres narrowly and privilege donor intent above 
all other considerations. Recent reforms, however, have moved courts toward 
a more flexible application of the doctrine. In this Article, I analyze certain 
high-profile cases that have driven these reforms-including the presumption 
of general charitable intent, the recognition of "wasteful" as a criterion, and 
the deployment of deviation-and explain how these reforms represent positive 
change. Moreover, I provide a theoretical grounding to account for the 
correctness of these reforms. I argue that charitable giving should be 
understood as embedded in a nexus of material and social exchanges-part of 
the "charitable gift economy. " I describe how charitable giving provides a 
range of benefits to donors, including both tangible tax benefits and intangible 
benefits such as status, social identity, and "warm glow. " Based on this 
understanding of the charitable gift economy, courts and charities alike should 
embrace current reforms and seek to expand them further. 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject is clear. In Scandinavian civilization, and in a good 
number of others, exchanges and contracts take place in the form of 
presents; in theory these are voluntary, in reality they are given and 
reciprocated obligatorily. 
-Marcel Mauss, The Gift1 
We should often blush at our noblest deeds if the world were to see 
all their underlying motives. 
-La Rochefoucauld, Maxims2 
Charitable trusts and charitable giving are big business. Outright gifts to 
charity by individuals totaled $217. 79 billion in 2011, in addition to $24.41 
billion in bequests made by individuals.3 It is estimated that by the year 2055 
some $41 trillion will change hands as Americans pass on accumulated wealth 
to the next generation.4 Much of this wealth will be transferred through the 
1 MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC 
SOCIETIES 3 (W.D. Halls trans., 1990). 
2 FRAN<;:OIS DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 89 (Leonard Tancock trans., 1959). 
3 GIVING USA, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2011 4 (2012). 
4 Charitable Giving Statistics, NATIONAL PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 
http://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ 
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creation of charitable trusts and private foundations, or through major giving 
by individuals to established charities. Private foundations, organized either as 
charitable trusts or non-profit corporations, filed 92,624 tax returns in 2009, 
and these foundations held $588.5 billion in assets.5 Moreover, in the same 
year, these private foundations distributed $40.9 billion for charitable 
purposes.6 These foundations and major gifts to charitable institutions help 
support colleges, hospitals, art museums, and social welfare organizations, to 
name only some of the organizations sustained by charitable donations. 
In most major charitable giving-whether a donor creates a charitable trust, 
a private (non-trust) foundation, or makes a gift to an institution-the donor's 
charitable purpose is specified in a governing document. The trust instrument, 
the incorporation documents and organizational charter, or the gift agreement 
will detail the charitable purpose along with any relevant spending restrictions 
or conditions. Some large gifts are unrestricted, just as some private 
foundations have very broad charitable purposes, allowing the institution 
maximal latitude in spending. Restrictions on gifts range in specificity. Some 
gifts are lightly restricted, such as a fund at a museum for the purchase of art, 
while others are quite limited, such as a gift to fund an annual poetry prize at a 
particular college. Because charitable trusts and other private foundations can 
exist in perpetuity, and because a majority of donors indeed intend for their 
trusts to last in perpetuity,7 there exists a strong potential for the terms of the 
restricted funds and gifts to become outdated due to shifts in institutional 
needs, the state of medical research, and the social landscape. 
In such cases-when the controlling terms of the trust outlive the need for, 
or the appropriateness of resource investment-the cy pres doctrine allows 
courts to modify the trust terms. The doctrine is set forth in section 413 of the 
Uniform Trust Code, which states that courts may modify the terms of a gift if 
the charitable purpose "becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to 
achieve, or wasteful .... "8 As the comment to this section mentions, cy pres is 
[http://perma.cc/ A28R-EJDT]. 
5 Cynthia Belmonte, Domestic Private Foundations and Related Excise Taxes, Tax Year 
2009, 32 IRS STAT. INCOME BULL. 114, 114 (Winter 2013) available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13pfwinbulexcise09. pdf [http://perma.cc/5 HKM-K3JJ]. 
6 Id. 
7 
"The Foundation Center found in 2004 that 69.3% of foundation respondents expected 
their foundations to carry on in perpetuity. Nine percent did not, and 22% were undecided." 
Kevin Laskowski, Perpetuity ls a Long Time, NA T'L CTR. FOR FAM. PHILANTHROPY (May 
15, 2008), https://www .ncfp.org/blog/2008/may-perpetuity-is-a-long-time.html 
[http://perma.cc/2EUJ-YYMW]. 
8 UNJF. TRUST CODE§ 413 (2010). The Uniform Trust Code § 413 states in relevant part, 
"if a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, 
or wasteful: (I) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part; (2) the trust property does not 
revert to the settlor or the settlor's successors in interest; and (3) the court may apply cy pres 
to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, 
in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes." Id. The 
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applied not only to modify the terms of charitable trusts, but also to modify any 
donor restrictions placed on charitable gifts.9 Furthermore, pursuant to both the 
Uniform Trust Code and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional 
Funds Act ("UPMIF A"), cy pres is applicable to restricted funds held by non-
profit corporations as well as charitable trusts. 10 Historically, courts have 
tended to apply cy pres both narrowly and infrequently, manifesting a 
reluctance to overturn donor intent. More recently, however, a number ofhigh-
profile cases with deeply contested results-including cases involving Fisk 
University, the Buck Trust, and the Barnes Foundation-have pushed 
questions concerning cy pres into public discourse, and propelled doctrinal 
reform. 11 
In this Article, I discuss changes to the Uniform Trust Code-including the 
presumption of general charitable intent, the recognition of "wasteful[ness]" as 
a criterion for cy pres application, and the deployment of equitable deviation-
and demonstrate their utility. These reforms have answered some longstanding 
critiques of the cy pres doctrine; 12 but critics have also argued that the reforms 
are too cautious, or even harmful. 13 I maintain that the recent cy pres reforms 
comment to this section further states that "(t]he doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to 
trusts, but also to other types of charitable dispositions, including those to charitable 
corporations. This section does not control dispositions made in nontrust form. However, in 
formulating rules for such dispositions, the courts often refer to the principles governing 
charitable trusts, which would include this Code." Id. § 413 cmt. 
9 Id.§ 413 cmt. 
IO Id.; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note at 4 (2006) 
("UPMIF A clarifies that the doctrines of cy pres and deviation apply to funds held by 
nonprofit corporations as well as to funds held by charitable trusts. Courts have applied trust 
law rules to nonprofit corporations in the past, but the Drafting Committee believed that 
statutory authority for applying these principles to nonprofit corporations would be 
helpful."). 
11 See infra notes 123-179, 200-228 and accompanying text. 
12 See Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1115 (1993) 
("Proposals to increase the flexibility of cy pres thus result in an unstable compromise 
between absolute dead hand control and unfettered judicial discretion."); C. Ronald Chester, 
Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L.J. 407, 417 (1979) (explaining that while some 
expansion of cy pres doctrine has been achieved, much less progress has been made to cy 
pres's general charitable intent requirement). 
13 Some scholars believe that the reform efforts have not been sufficient to modernize an 
outdated doctrine. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy Pres Reform: Principled 
Practice to Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 
97 (2007) (stating that calls for reform, "for all their merit, have gone virtually unheeded"); 
see also Melanie B. Leslie, Time To Sever The Dead Hand: Fisk University and the Cost of 
the Cy Pres Doctrine, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (2012). Critics of the reform 
measures also exist. See Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1307, 1312 (2010) ("UTC section 413 tilts the theoretical balance of interests 
associated with cy pres too far toward the public interest . . . ."); Eric G. 
Pearson, Reforming the Reform of the Cy Pres Doctrine: A Proposal to Protect Testator 
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represent positive-though unappreciated-change. The changes adopted by 
the Uniform Trust Code, which has yet to be adopted by all states, 14 have the 
potential to reduce litigation time and cost in cy pres cases. These changes 
likewise have the potential to benefit both nonprofit institutions and the public 
by increasing institutional access to restricted gift funds. 
Moreover, I put forth a theory that fully accounts for the correctness of these 
and additional reforms. The lessening of dead-hand control has justified the 
traditional availability of cy pres modifications as well as the recent Uniform 
Trust Code changes that provide new latitude to nonprofit institutions. This 
theory is grounded in the concepts of economic efficiency (that is, enabling the 
efficient use of assets) and, less often, intergenerational faimess. 15 Cy pres 
facilitates anti-dead-hand policy by allowing for the modification or removal 
of value-impairing terms. Restraining dead-hand control remains an important 
justification for allowing cy pres and granting flexibility. Anti-dead-hand 
control, however, provides a theoretical grounding for cy pres that addresses 
only extrinsic factors, such as changed circumstances. 
I propose, instead, a theory that justifies cy pres modification of charitable 
gifts based on factors intrinsic to charitable gifts and puts forth the idea that 
charitable gifts represent a particular type of property requiring special 
treatment. This theory rests on the concept of charitable giving as an intricate 
constellation of multi-part exchanges-what I call the charitable gift economy. 
The theory of the charitable gift economy explains how and why charitable 
Intent, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 127, 127 (2006); Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting "Donor 
Intent" in Charitable Foundations: Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 
U. PENN. L. REV. 665, 668 (1997) (arguing that society should, but the legal system should 
not, permit deviations from donors' wishes). For a comparative perspective, see Peter 
Luxton, Cy Pres and the Ghost of Things that Might Have Been, 47 CONY. & PROP. LAW. 
107, 116 (1983). 
14 Currently, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform 
Trust Code. Legislative Fact Sheet-Trust Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code 
[http://perma.cc/SX5W-F485] (listing jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Trust 
Code: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
15 LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 127 (1955). See also John H. 
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1105, 1110 n.33 (2004) 
("Most discussion of the anti-dead-hand policy has centered on the rule against perpetuities 
and has emphasized the need to promote alienability of land. Simes rightly pointed out that 
this rationale does not explain why the rule should apply to trusts in which the trustee has 
the power of sale .... Simes's alternative justification, 'strik[ing] a fair balance between the 
desires of members of the present [and] succeeding generations,' ... is a slogan, not an 
explanation."); John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law's Limits on the Sett/or's 
Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010). 
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gifts have particular idiosyncratic property values by providing a frame for 
better understanding charitable giving as a socially significant practice that 
creates various and multiple meanings within a gift. Like the anti-dead-hand 
theory, this theory ultimately provides justification for increased flexibility in 
cy pres doctrine. 
Anthropologists and sociologists have long believed that gifts are a strong 
form of currency in an economy driven by non-market transactions. Marcel 
Mauss, in his seminal study of Polynesian and other cultures, demonstrated the 
ways in which gifts have been deployed to create an economy of transfers, 
services, and obligations governed by social norms and customary behavior. 16 
Economists have likewise been drawn to the question of gift giving, trying to 
understand what motivates individuals to engage in the practice of gifting since 
it generally contravenes individuals' economic interests. Thorstein Veblen put 
forth foundational theories about conspicuous consumption and leisure, 
positing that individuals spend and give for reasons related to social status and 
class expectations.17 Building on these theories of social exchange, Eric Posner 
has concluded that gifts are motivated by altruism, status building, and trust 
creation, and has observed that "[ f]requently ... transfers that are called 'gifts' 
do call for a return transfer, if only implicitly or by convention .... "18 Carol 
Rose, alluding to the norm of reciprocity, has asked: "Does anybody really 
ever give anything away?"l9 
Sociologists have added to the conversation by exporting the debate about 
gift-as-exchange into the realm of philanthropy. They have examined the 
various reasons for which donors give, paying attention to the complicated 
cultural networks that charitable gifts create and maintain.20 Scholars in 
16 Robert J. Shiller, discussing the importance of retaining the charitable deduction, has 
noted that "[g]ift-giving has a long history. Marcel Mauss, in 'The Gift' in 1924, and Karl 
Polanyi, in 'The Great Transformation' in 1944, argue that reciprocal gift-giving-giving 
with some hope of recognition or response-has pervaded healthy human society from its 
Neolithic beginnings." Robert J. Shiller, Please Don't Mess With the Charitable Deduction, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at BU7. 
17 See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 41-79 (1953). 
18 Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous 
Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 569. 
19 Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become 
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 295 (1992). 
io See, e.g., FRANCIE 0STROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE 
PHILANTHROPY 32 (1995) ("It is important to note that among elites, involvement with 
organizations is often tied to family identity and to the social networks in which the donor 
participates."). See also Emily Barman, An Institutional Approach to Donor Control: From 
Dyadic Ties to a Field-Level Analysis, 112 AM. J. Soc. 1416, 1422 n.3 (2007) (explaining 
that communities centered around class, geography, religion, race and ethnicity "entail 
social norms and networks that produce particular modes of donor behavior"); Susan A. 
Ostrander, The Growth of Donor Control: Revisiting the Social Relations of Philanthropy, 
36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 356, 361 (2007) (explaining that today donors may 
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philanthropy studies and fundraising experts have scrutinized the factors that 
motivate individual giving, particularly in order to craft better fundraising 
strategies.21 The concept of the charitable gift as a part of a charitable gift 
economy has not, however, been discussed in legal scholarship concerning 
trust principles and the regulation of charitable gifts. This omission is striking 
because charitable gifts reveal and exemplify the gift economy at work. 
Furthermore, the charitable gift economy is significant because it encompasses 
not just the micro connections of family, friends, and colleagues (conventional 
parties in non-charitable giving exchanges), but also macro connections 
between individuals and institutions. My contribution with this Article, 
therefore, is to develop and apply the concept of the charitable gift economy to 
charitable giving law, in order to help reimagine the base assumptions inherent 
in charitable giving regulation and cy pres rules. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I describe the evolution of 
charitable trust regulation, charity law, and the cy pres doctrine. I pay 
particular attention to how charitable giving law developed such that donor 
intent became the lodestar of judicial analysis. Part II of the Article contains an 
analysis of recent cy pres cases that have generated commentary and driven 
reform. These cases exemplify some of the problems with cy pres doctrine and 
demonstrate the ways in which the reforms put forth in the Uniform Trust 
Code could have or already have benefitted plaintiff institutions. In Part III, I 
develop the idea of the charitable gift economy, drawing on established 
concepts of the gift economy in other fields, and discuss the nexus of 
exchanges that constitutes this charitable gift economy. I detail the benefits, 
both tangible and intangible, that flow to charitable donors, and clarify why 
donor control should be restricted based on the robust nature of these benefits. 
I conclude that in light of the realities of this charitable gift economy, the 
Uniform Trust Code reforms are appropriate, and donor intent should be even 
less controlling and increasingly time-limited moving forward. 
give based on "their own 'philanthropic agendas'" which "probably have more to do with 
'personal considerations"' including "family traditions of giving ... and giving because one 
is asked to do so by members of one's social or professional or business networks"); Susan 
A. Ostrander & Paul G. Schervish, Giving and Getting: Philanthropy as a Social Relation, 
in CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY: STRENGTHENING THEORY AND PRACTICE 
67, 70 ( 1990) ("[P]hilanthropy is a particular type of social relation that may occur in 
government and corporate settings, and it most certainly occurs in families and 
neighborhoods."). 
21 See, e.g., PETER FRUMKIN, STRATEGIC GIVING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF 
PHILANTHROPY 3 (2006) ("I diagnose the core problems in the ~orld of giving today, offer a 
framework for reconstructing practice . . . and explore how to promote a more vital 
philanthropic sector."). See also Joan Mount, Why Donors Give, 7 NONPROFIT MGMT. & 
LEADERSHIP 3, 5 (1996) ("This article examines motives that lie behind personal 
philanthropy ... and why donors give the amounts they do. Extrapolating from these 
findings, I ... suggest some of the implications ... for fundraisers."). 
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I. THE PRIMACY OF DONOR INTENT 
Traditionally, for a number of reasons, courts have hewed very closely to 
donor intent. In this Part, I analyze the historical development of the law 
regulating charitable trusts in America and describe the various factors that led 
to the strict judicial adherence to donor intent. I then describe the history of the 
cy pres doctrine and its close relationship to the development of charitable trust 
law. I also describe the modern cy pres doctrine both before and after recent 
Uniform Trust Code reforms. 
A. Charitable Trusts and the Early Calculus of Giving 
In early American courts, misunderstandings concerning the legal status of 
charitable trusts and Chancery's equitable jurisdiction over these trusts were 
common among both judges and lawyers. In particular, confusion persisted 
concerning the ability of an individual to bequeath a charitable gift to an 
unascertainable beneficiary-such as an unincorporated association. At the 
same time that state courts were grappling with this question, Justice John 
Marshall answered a different legal question and put forth an early and 
influential theory of charitable giving in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward,22 grounded in the importance of donor intent.23 Marshall's theory 
of great men making charitable gifts to build a legacy was reinforced by 
subsequent shifts in the economic landscape and the emergence of major 
philanthropists. 
1. Fear of the Unascertainable Beneficiary 
In the wake of the Revolution and eager to clear the statute books of English 
influence, "state legislatures and the courts began to test every point of English 
law."24 The resulting legal confusion produced a Virginia case concerning the 
validity of a bequest on the U.S. Supreme Court's docket in 1819. The case, 
Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors,25 turned 
on the question of whether an unincorporated association could be the legal 
recipient or beneficiary of the deceased Hart's intended charitable trust.26 At 
issue was the status of such a bequest before the enactment of the Statute of 
22 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
23 Id. at 518 ("An act of the State legislature of New-Hampshire, altering the charter ... 
is an act impairing the obligation of the charter, and is unconstitutional and void."). 
24 HOWARDS. MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY: 1776-
1844, 10 (1961). States modified and repealed English statutes to varying degrees, and some 
states, like Virginia, enacted legislation that effectuated the wholesale repeal of English Jaw. 
Id. ("An act of December 27, 1792, titled 'An Act Repealing under Certain Restrictions, all 
Statutes or Acts of Parliament of Great Britain, heretofore in Force within this 
Commonwealth,' placed Virginia formally beyond the reach of English jurisprudence."). 
25 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819), overruled by Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
127 (1844). 
26 Id. at 28. 
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Charitable Uses in England,27 which sustained bequests to unincorporated 
associations.28 The question was important because, as Justice Story observed, 
"the statute of Elizabeth not being in force in Virginia ... it becomes a 
material inquiry, how far the jurisdiction and doctrines of the court of chancery 
respecting charitable uses depends upon that statute, and whether, independent 
of it, the present donation can be upheld. "29 The Court held that there was no 
precedent outside of the repealed statute for supporting the gift, and the 
bequest failed. 
It was not until 1844, and the publication of previously unavailable English 
Chancery reports, that the Court overturned Hart and established support for 
charitable trusts in Vidal v. Girard's Executors.30 Despite the ruling in the 
Girard case, however, the lack of ascertainable beneficiaries continued to 
cause bequests to fail in a number of states.31 For example, in the case of 
27 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). The Statute of Charitable Uses 
was enacted in 1601, a reform driven by the desire to "efficiently protect the use of 
charitable assets, and [cultivate] the ethos of ... such giving," such that "the middle and 
upper middle classes, particularly the merchant gentry, might increase their support towards 
ends that the State approved." James J. Fishman, The Political Use of Private Benevolence: 
The Statute of Charitable Uses, PACE UNIVERSITY (Apr. 23, 2008), 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l486&context=lawfaculty 
[http://perma.cc/E8KX-YPBA]. The Statute "is famous for providing a legal definition of 
charitable purpose and is the starting point for the modern law of charity." Id. 
28 Preachers' Aid Soc'y of the Me. Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. 
Rich, 45 Me. 552, 552 (1858) ("A bequest to charitable uses, to an unincorporated society 
may be enforced, by virtue of the statute of 43 Eliz. c. 4 .... "). 
29 Trs. of the Phila. Baptist Assoc. v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819) (Story, J., 
concurring), overruled by Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127. 
30 Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 196 ("But very strong additional light has been thrown 
upon this subject by the recent publication of the Commissioners on the public Records in 
England, which contain a very curious and interesting collection of the chancery records in 
the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and in the earlier reigns."). For a discussion of the case and its 
cultural resonance, see Robert A. Ferguson, The Girard Will Case: Charity and Inheritance 
in the City of Brotherly Love, in PHILANTHROPY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: SELECTED PAPERS 
1 (Jack Salzman ed., 1987). 
31 Edith Fisch remarks that "it was a case of locking the barn door after the horse had 
been stolen .... [T]he error became so firmly entrenched in ... law that the Girard decision 
failed to remedy the situation." EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 12-13 (1950). Following Girard, a small set of cases upheld charitable trusts on the 
grounds that English common law supported them. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 8 N.Y. 
525, 542 (1853) ("I have come to the conclusion that the Jaw of charities was at an indefinite 
but early period in English judicial history, engrafted upon the common law .... "). For a 
description of the approximately half-dozen cases in New York that followed this analysis, 
see Stanley N. Katz, Barry Sullivan & C. Paul Beach, Legal Change and Legal Autonomy: 
Charitable Trusts in New York, 1777-1893, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 51, 67-68 (1985). Once 
equity and law merged in New York, this line of cases was overturned. Id. at 72 (stating that 
following the "abolition of the Court of Chancery" New York's Court of Appeals 
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Bascom v. Albertson,32 the high court in New York ruled that charitable trusts 
created through bequests with no ascertainable beneficiaries were void under 
state law.33 New York's settled policy, the court stated, was rather to 
"encourage donations and endowments for educational, religious and 
charitable purposes, by providing for the administration of such funds through 
organized and responsible agencies, sanctioned by legislative authority, and 
subject to legislative regulation and control."34 
The most notorious case was that of Samuel Tilden, a corporate lawyer 
turned politician who became the governor of New York and was the 
Democratic candidate for the U.S. Presidency in 1876. Tilden left a bequest 
directing his executors and trustees to procure an act of incorporation for "an 
institution to be known as the 'Tilden Trust' with capacity to establish and 
maintain a free library and reading-room in the city of New York, and to 
promote such scientific and educational objects as my said executors and 
trustees may more particularly designate."35 The court concluded that the trust 
was void and, because the intention to promote science and education was 
unacceptably indefinite, the bequest to the library failed as well.36 The court 
asked: "Can it be seriously claimed that there is any duty resting on [the 
trustees] to establish a library in the city ofNew York?"37 
This result in the Tilden case garnered remarkable attention both locally and 
nationally, and the bulk of the criticism derived from the fact that the court's 
hostility to charitable trusts was overriding donor intent. While the case was 
pending, the New York Times published an article that stated optimistically, 
"[t]he courts will undoubtedly consider the purpose and intent of the testator, 
and whether by the creation of the Tilden Trust that purpose and intent can be 
carried out .... "38 After the decision, James Barr Ames observed that "the 
abandoned "the favor developed for charitable trusts in the old Court of Chancery"). For a 
short overview of the development of charitable trusts, see MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, 
GOVERNING NONPROFIT 0RGANIZA TIONS: FEDERAL AND ST ATE LAW AND REGULATION 44-48 
(2008). 
32 34 N.Y. 584 (1866). 
33 Id. at 584. 
34 Id. Like Virginia, New York had repealed the Statute of Charitable Uses. Id. 
Moreover, addressing the Girard argument that early Chancery cases demonstrated valid 
bequests to unascertainable beneficiaries, the court stated: 
The legislature of this State could not fail to see that the earlier English system of 
charity, which was superseded and displaced by the statute of Elizabeth, was 
fragmentary and disjointed; that it was obscure in its origin, incongruous in its theory, 
and disastrous in its tendency; that it had been discarded as an excrescence upon the 
common law .... 
Id. at 605. 
35 Tilden v. Green, 28 N.E. 880, 881 (N.Y. 1891). 
36 Id. at 888-89. 
37 Id. at 887. 
38 The Tilden Trust Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1887, at 4. 
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beneficent purpose of the testator was unmistakably expressed in a will 
executed with all due formalities" and that the court's decision was a 
"deplorable disappointment of the testator's will."39 Because of great public 
dissatisfaction, the New York legislature passed the Tilden Act in 1893, which 
authorized charitable trusts and, more particularly, bequests made to 
unascertainable beneficiaries for charitable purposes.40 This legislation was a 
turning point for the regulation of charitable trusts and marked the legal 
embrace of charitable trusts as a vehicle for philanthropic giving. 
2. Dartmouth and the Charitable Bargain 
Despite judicial misgivings about the nature of charitable trusts, support did 
exist for charitable giving when done through the proper channels. In fact, an 
influential judicial theory in support of charitable giving, set forth in 
Dartmouth, was beginning to take shape during this same period.41 Decided in 
the same term as the Hart case, Dartmouth addressed the New Hampshire 
legislature's ability to modify Dartmouth College's charter through legislation 
without the express consent of the college trustees. The charter was, Marshall 
remarked, "a contract for the security and disposition of property"42 and ample 
consideration existed in the grant of "perpetual application of the fund to its 
object."43 Marshall described the contract entered into between a donor and the 
State: "[ c ]haritable, or public spirited individuals ... apply to the government, 
state their beneficent object, and offer to advance the money necessary for its 
accomplishment, provided the government will confer on the instrument which 
is to execute their designs the capacity to execute them."44 
The charitable bargain, accordingly, consisted of individuals dedicating 
resources to public benefit in return for a way to implement the charitable 
vision of the individual. Adherence to donor restrictions was both an incentive 
and the reward for charitable giving. Marshall observed: 
39 J.B. Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Trust," 5 HARV. L. REV. 389, 389 (1892). 
40 The Act stated that: 
No gift, grant, bequest or devise to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent 
uses, which shall, in other respects be valid under the laws of this state, shall or be 
deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated 
as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the same. 
Tilden Act, 1893 N.Y. Laws 1748 (codified as amended at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 113, 
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW§ 12). 
41 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 518 (1819) ("The 
charter granted by the British crown to the trustees of Dartmouth College ... is a contract 
within the meaning of ... the constitution of the United States .... "). 
42 Id. at 644. 
43 Id. at 642. 
44 Id. at 637-38. Justice Story, concurring in the opinion, also remarked that there was an 
implied contract between the corporation and the beneficiaries "that [the corporation] would 
administer his bounty according to the terms, and for the objects stipulated in the charter." 
Id. at 690 (Story, J., concurring). 
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It requires no very critical examination of the human mind to enable us to 
determine, that one great inducement to these gifts is the conviction felt 
by the giver, that the disposition he makes of them is immutable .... All 
such gifts are made in the pleasing, perhaps delusive hope, that the charity 
will flow forever in the channel which the givers have marked out for it.45 
In this calculus of giving, the donor was motivated by altruism and the 
desire to further social welfare and the public good. Because the donor 
received no benefit other than the ability to impose his will by restricting a gift 
in perpetuity, the organization owed it to the donor to execute his design as 
intended. The charitable bargain was an exchange of resources for immortality. 
The Dartmouth case, therefore, helped to foster certain judicial values and 
traced an outline for the future of charity law.46 In cases that followed, courts 
cited Dartmouth a number of times concerning the charitable bargain. City of 
Louisville v. President & Trustees of the University of Louisville41 turned on 
similar questions of the city's rights with respect to University governance 
after the city had made a major gift to the University.48 Ruling in favor of the 
University and citing to Dartmouth, the Chief Justice of the Kentucky court 
stated, "there is certainly a contract between the donors and the donee. And as 
the donors parted with their property under the inducements of the charter 
promising a continuance of the corporation, the faith of the state was pledged 
to them .... "49 Likewise, relying on Dartmouth, the court in one of the leading 
New York decisions supporting charitable trusts observed that charitable 
giving "was a contract between the government and the donors, one of the 
terms of which was, that the lands should be held by the corporation in 
perpetuity to promote the pious and charitable objects of its institution."50 An 
45 Id. at 647. 
46 Writing about the Dartmouth case, Mark D. McGarvie has remarked, "[t]he beginning 
of philanthropic organizations occurred not with the funding of the large trusts at the tum of 
the twentieth century, but in the creation of the legal model for philanthropic pursuits during 
the early republic." Mark D. McGarvie, The Dartmouth College Case and the legal Design 
of Civil Society, in CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 91, 105 
(Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie eds., 2003). McGarvie suggests that the 
Dartmouth case moved philanthropy away from a community model present in the colonial 
period "by demanding formal legal structures for religious and philanthropic organizations." 
Id. 
47 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 642 (1855). 
48 Id. at 666 (stating that the case's two principal questions are whether the University's 
original charter is constitutionally protected as a contract and, if it is a contract, whether the 
city's charter violates the original University charter). 
49 Id. at 686. 
50 Williams v. Williams, 8 N.Y. 525, 534 (1853). "Subsequent decisions, however, 
repeatedly attacked the Williams case, and its scope was narrowed until it was virtually 
impossible to formulate a charitable trust of personalty that would be held valid." Edith L. 
Fisch, American Acceptance of Charitable Trusts, 28 NOTRE DAME LAW. 219, 223 (1953) 
(footnote omitted). 
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Indiana court likewise concluded that the state legislature could not pass any 
law that would impair the contractual obligations between an incorporated 
charitable organization and its donors.51 Courts reaffirmed and propagated the 
legal notion set forth in Dartmouth that charitable organizations owed donors 
adherence to their intent as a matter of contract, ultimately helping to justify 
support for both charitable giving and the primacy of donor intent. 
3. The Triumph of Philanthropy 
Seismic changes in wealth holding and philanthropy at the end of the 
nineteenth century helped to both reform the law of charitable trusts and 
reaffirm the importance of donor intent. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
changed economic conditions and national markets had created a class of 
newly minted millionaires.52 In 1892, the New York Tribune counted and 
published the names of 4047 millionaires; by 1916, there were 40,000 
millionaires (including John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford, who were 
actually billionaires).53 A few months after the list was published in 1916, 
another article, American Millionaires and Their Public Gifts, was published, 
and "[t]he author observed that it would be interesting if the millionaires 
enumerated by the Tribune could be separated into givers and non-givers."54 
Shortly after that, "George J. Hagar, a member of the staff of Appleton's 
Annual Cyclopaedia, began in 1893 to collect figures on gifts and bequests ... 
for religious, charitable and educational purposes."55 
Charitable giving brought public status and created public personae in a new 
and spectacular way. Philanthropy was biography, and wealthy individuals 
sought to make their mark on the social landscape through charitable giving. In 
51 Edwards v. Jagers, 19 Ind. 407, 415 (1862) ("[T]here was an implied contract, between 
the donor and the corporation, that the property should be used only for the purposes 
indicated by the charter."). 
52 According to Robert A. Gross, this development in giving marked a tum from charity 
("concrete and individual") to philanthropy ("abstract and institutional"). See Robert A. 
Gross, Giving in America: From Charity to Philanthropy, in CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND 
CIVILITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 46, at 31. 
53 OLIVIER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 8 (2011 ). 
The list was arranged state by state, city by city. The kind of economic activity thought 
to be the major factor in the creation of each fortune was indicated. The Tribune's 
financial editor claimed to have consulted 1,500 merchants, bankers, commercial 
agents, lawyers, surrogates of counties, trustees and other citizens all over the country 
in a position to know the facts. 
Merle Curti, Judith Green & Roderick Nash, Anatomy of Giving: Millionaires in the Late 
19th Century, 15 AM. Q. 416, 418 (1963). 
54 Curti et al., supra note 53, at 419. 
55 Id. at 420. Hagar excluded all gifts under $5000. "'The result of the first year's quest,' 
Hagar later wrote, 'was such a grand tribute to the humanity of the American men and 
women' that he continued to make similar investigations through the year 1903." Id. For his 
results, see id. at 421 (Table I). 
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this context of new wealth, "philanthropic projects were acts of generosity and 
hubris on a scale never before entertained. The new rich felt free to both 
envision and fashion the common good, and they did so."56 These 
philanthropists viewed charity as both a creative, individual vision and the 
personal responsibility of great men.57 Tum-of-the-century philanthropy, 
exemplified by the transformative gifts of elite industrialists, was the work of 
eminent individuals who sought to leave their mark on the nation and expected 
their legacies to endure intact. In this context, the bargain set forth by 
Dartmouth--charitable gifts in exchange for immutable legacies-still 
prevailed. 
These rich industrialists, anxious to build institutions and better society 
while also building personal legacies, helped to finally bring about acceptance 
of the charitable trust form. As Olivier Zunz has remarked: "[A]mbitious new 
philanthropists placed themselves in opposition to the centuries-old charitable 
practice of carefully delimiting purpose and beneficiary .... They conceived of 
their largesse as open-ended so that it might achieve the greatest impact on 
society."58 The recurrent question was how to effect these philanthropic goals 
within the existing legal framework. As Andrew Carnegie announced in The 
Gospel of Wealth: "the problem of our age is the proper administration of 
wealth."59 Charity law varied by state and there was no uniform treatment of 
the body of law, with many states still refusing to recognize trusts with no 
ascertainable beneficiaries.60 However, with great "accumulations of private 
56 ZUNZ, supra note 53, at 8. Merle Curti suggests: 
The American emphasis on individual achievement and on sustained activity to that 
end have also given a distinct stamp to large-scale giving. Having spent untold effort in 
getting rich, having tasted the sweets and boredom of extravagant spending, some, 
driven by a never-ceasing lust to achieve, turned to philanthropy. Carnegie and 
Rockefeller, each relatively frugal in what he spent on himself, set their hearts on 
giving with the imagination, organization and efficiency that had marked their 
activities in steel and oil. 
Merle Curti, American Philanthropy and the National Character, 10 AM. Q. 420, 429 
(1958). Exemplary institutions founded during this period include Cornell University, 
Stanford University, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Chicago, the Sage 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the New York Public Library, to name a few. 
See ZUNZ, supra note 53, at 9-10. 
57 See, e.g.' ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEAL TH ( 1889) (describing the duty of 
the wealthy as the administration of excess funds to produce the most beneficial results for 
the community). 
58 ZUNZ, supra note 53, at 12. 
59 CARNEGIE, supra note 57. Carnegie condemned the practice of giving through bequests 
and charitable trusts, stating: "Men who leave vast sums in this way may fairly be thought 
men who would not have left it at all, had they been able to take it with them. The memories 
of such cannot be held in grateful remembrance, for there is no grace in their gifts." Id. 
Carnegie supported high estate taxes at death and urged all those with philanthropic leanings 
to give during their lives. Id 
60 See infra text accompanying notes 68-71. 
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wealth, the need for effective mechanisms to enforce and sustain charitable 
gifts became increasingly manifest."61 Similarly, a public policy of 
encouraging charitable giving coalesced as "courts began to recognize the 
necessity of encouraging contributions to further the welfare of a pioneer 
society by private means, thereby reducing the expenses of the government."62 
Ultimately, many state legislatures-influenced by the Tilden Trust 
decision, in many cases-admitted the necessity of the charitable trust form 
and enacted charitable corporation acts. These major philanthropists helped to 
render charitable trusts "favorites of the law."63 These same philanthropists, 
inspired by personal visions of the greater good, also reaffirmed the notion that 
donor intent was a primary value and that great instances of charitable giving 
were to be rewarded with perpetual application of restrictive terms. 
B. Overcoming Opposition to the Cy Pres Doctrine 
The cy pres doctrine, a doctrine of deep but obscure historical roots,64 
allows courts to modify the terms of an outdated or excessively narrow trust 
agreement. Cy pres derives from Norman French and means "as near," the full 
phrase being "cy pres comme possible," or "as near as possible."65 Originally 
the monarch exercised the cy pres power; however, the doctrine subsequently 
evolved to provide that "equity will, when a charity is originally or later 
becomes impossible or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute another 
charitable object which is believed to approach the original purpose as closely 
as possible."66 The modem statement of the doctrine, which is less exacting, 
61 FISCH, supra note 31, at 117. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 118. See also In re Knouse's Will, 121N.W.2d151, 153 (Iowa 1963) ("Other 
general principles of the law as it relates to charitable trusts are that they are favorites of the 
law."); In re Porter's Estate, 187 P.2d 520, 525 (Kan. 1947); In re Pruner's Estate, 162 A.2d 
626, 629 (Pa. 1960) ("Charities are favorites of the law and a gift, even for a specific 
charitable purpose, should be liberally construed whenever reasonably possible."). 
64 FISCH, supra note 31, at 3 ("The doctrine of cy pres ... was known and used in Rome 
before Constantine . . . . A case applying the cy pres principle appears in the Digest of 
Justinian."). "So far as can be ascertained, [the term] cy-pres first appears in Littleton's 
Tenures (c. 1481)." L.A. SHERIDAN & V.T.H. DELANY, THE CY-PRES DOCTRINE 5 (1959). Cy 
pres originated, in part, as an intent-defeating doctrine. The classic example of this is found 
in Da Costa v. De Pas, (1754) 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch.). In that case the king used his cy pres 
power to allot money designated for the purpose of teaching Jewish law and religion to 
instruct foundlings in the Christian religion. Id. at 151-52 ("[H]is Majesty . . . was 
graciously pleased ... to give £1000 part of the said sum of £1200 towards supporting a 
preacher, and to instruct the children under their care in the Christian religion."). 
65 GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 431 
(2013). "The fairly common usage, 'si pray,' seems to be a mixture of French and English 
pronunciation." Id. 
66 Id. 
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provides that the court will modify the trust terms "in a manner consistent with 
the settlor's charitable purposes."67 
Cy pres doctrine developed in America alongside and in step with the law of 
charitable trusts. Like the charitable trust, the cy pres doctrine encountered 
significant judicial resistance in early state courts because of its association 
with English law and royal prerogative. Nonetheless, over time, cy pres gained 
legal acceptance and courts began to use it in order to modify trust terms. In 
this section, I describe the gradual acceptance of cy pres as well as the current 
status of the doctrine. 
1. Resistance to Prerogative Cy Pres Power 
Because of strong judicial resistance to the charitable trust form as a vehicle 
for philanthropy, the cy pres doctrine was largely irrelevant and rarely invoked 
as a tool for modifying trust terms in the years directly following the 
Revolution until after the Civil War.68 In fact, "[o]fthe fifteen states which by 
1860 had occasion to consider the cy pres doctrine, the courts of some ten 
states had either condemned or repudiated the doctrine."69 Of the five states 
that approved the doctrine, some of the state courts applied the doctrine 
without naming it, and Kentucky applied it once in 1839 only to repudiate it in 
later cases.70 Before 1860, only Pennsylvania had enacted a cy pres statute.71 
For the most part, courts that considered the cy pres doctrine rejected it 
because of confusion concerning jurisdictional questions and the association of 
cy pres with royal prerogative. In England, two types of cy pres-prerogative 
and judicial-had developed over the years. 72 Many American courts, 
believing that cy pres derived from the prerogative power of the monarch and 
not from the equitable jurisdiction of Chancery (a belief perpetuated in part by 
the Hart case) reacted to the doctrine with antagonism.73 
67 UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 413 (2010). 
68 FISCH, supra note 31, at 11 7 ("Until the middle of the nineteenth century, because 
there were few charitable trusts, the need for the application of the cy pres doctrine was 
rarely felt."). 
69 Id. at 115-16 n.l. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
72 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 65, § 432. "The prerogative power is vested in the 
crown, as parens patriae, and is exercisable by the sign manual of the king, that is, by a 
direction of the crown under his signature." Id. Judicial cy pres was that exercised by the 
Court of Chancery. Id. See also Hamish Gray, The History and Development in England of 
the Cy-Pres Principle in Charities, 33 B.U. L. R.Ev. 30 (1953). 
73 See FISCH, supra note 31, at l l 6(Deeming the cy pres doctrine contrary to the spirit of 
our democratic institutions, and in conflict with the doctrine of separation of powers, the 
early courts reviled and excoriated the English charity doctrine."). In Bascom, the New York 
court stated that, even if Chancery's cy pres jurisdiction predated the Statute of Charitable 
Uses, it was "an excrescence upon the common law, inappropriate even to a government in 
which the crown and the mitre were in mutual alliance and dependence." Bascom v. 
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In Fontain v. Ravene/,14 a leading case at the time, the Court referenced the 
Hart case as evidence that cy pres was a uniquely prerogative power: "there 
can be no doubt that the power of the crown to superintend and enforce 
charities existed in very early times; and ... [t]hat it is a branch of prerogative, 
and not a part of the ordinary powers of the chancellor, is sufficiently 
certain."75 Accordingly, the Court concluded that "[p]owers not judicial, 
exercised by the chancellor merely as the representative of the sovereign, and 
by virtue of the king's prerogative as parens patrice, are not possessed by the 
circuit courts."76 State courts followed suit. The New York high court, in 
determining that a charitable trust was void, remarked: "In England, the cy 
pres power would be exerted ... by a master of the Court of Chancery, or the 
crown would appoint the charity under the sign manual. In either mode of 
exercising that power, it rests upon prerogative, and ... does not belong to our 
judicial system. "77 
The support for an opposing view-that judicial and royal prerogative cy 
pres were in fact two different things--came from Girard and the line of cases 
that followed. These cases, based on the Girard court's new understanding of 
Chancery's powers, posited that Chancery possessed ordinary jurisdiction over 
valid charitable trusts before the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses. 
Consequently, American equity courts could, like their early English 
counterparts, assume judicial cy pres powers. The Kentucky high court, as a 
consequence, was led to conclude as early as 1836 that judicial cy pres was 
available "where there is an available charity to an identified object, and a 
particular mode is prescribed which is not available. Then a court of equity 
may substitute, or sanction, some other mode to effectuate the declared 
intention of the donor; but cannot declare an object for him."78 
By the end of the century, the concept of judicial cy pres had become 
common. In In re Creighton's Estate,19 the Nebraska high court said, "it needs 
no argument or elaboration to reach the conclusion that, under our system of 
equity jurisprudence, the [cy pres] powers exercised are purely judicial, 
derived solely from the organic law, and the statutes, including the common 
Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584, 605 (1866). 
74 58 U.S. (1 How.) 369 (1854). 
75 Id. at 389 (internal quotations omitted). 
76 Id. at 384. The Court further stated that "[a]n arbitrary rule in regard to property, 
whether by a king or chancellor, or both, leads to uncertainty and injustice." Id. at 389. 
77 Bascom, 34 N.Y. at 594 (quoting Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N.Y. 298, 311 (1861)). See 
also Beekman, 23 N. Y. 298; Miller v. Teachout, 24 Ohio St. 525, 529 (1874) ("The English 
doctrine of cy pres is not the law here-it resting entirely on prerogative, and being foreign 
to our judicial system and form of government."). 
78 Moore's Heirs v. Moore's Devisees, 34 Ky. (1 Dana) 354, 366 (1836). See also 
Erskine v. Whitehead, 84 Ind. 357, 364 (1882) ("It is ... well established that there is a cy 
pres power, which is judicial in its origin and character, recognized and exercised by the 
English and by the American courts generally."). 
79 84 N.W. 273 (Neb. 1900). 
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law .... "8° Courts had reframed judicial understanding of Chancery's 
historical powers and found arguments to counter those concerning the 
arbitrary nature of prerogative power.81 
2. Modem Judicial Application of Cy Pres 
Between 1900 and 1949, twenty-one jurisdictions applied the cy pres 
doctrine for the first time. 82 By 1950, twenty-nine states had judicially adopted 
the doctrine.83 By 2004, the doctrine was either statutorily or judicially 
accepted by all states except Alaska and North Dakota.84 The doctrine has been 
adopted in the Restatement of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code. The 
Uniform Trust Code's formulation of the cy pres doctrine provides: 
If a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, 
impossible to achieve, or wasteful: (1) the trust does not fail, in whole or 
in part; (2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor's 
successors in interest; and (3) the court may apply cy pres to modify or 
terminate the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or 
distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the settlor' s 
charitable purposes.85 
80 Id. at 275. 
81 See FISCH, supra note 31, at 120 ("[T]he problem of enforcing and upholding the ever 
increasing number of charitable trusts, the public policy underlying ... induc[ ed] the courts 
to dispel the mists of confusion that had enshrouded the cy pres doctrine for many years, 
and to adopt an attitude ofliberal application."). 
82 Id. at 120 n.16. 
83 Id. at 92. 
84 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 31, at 1 73. The following states have statutorily 
authorized cy pres: ALA. CODE § 35-4-251 (1975) (repealed in 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-10413 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE§§ 15407, 15410 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 12, § 3541 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-62 (1996); IND. CODE§ 30-4-3-27 (1971); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2331-9:2337 (1954); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-302 
(LexisNexis 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §SK, ch. 214, §§ 3(10), lOB (1979); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 554.351 (1915); MINN. STAT. § 501B.31(2) (1989); Mo. REV. STAT. 
§§ 166.101 (1963) (gift for educational purposes), 352.210 (1939) (surplus on dissolution of 
religious or charitable association); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-504 (1989) (repealed in 
2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498:4-a (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-4-413 (2003); 
N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 8-1.I(c) (McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 36A-53 
(1991) (repealed in 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 601-602 (1965); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 7740.3 (2006); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-1 (1956); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-9-4 (1955); 
UTAH CODE ANN.,§ 75-7-413 (LexisNexis 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2328 (1985); W. 
VA. CODE§ 35-2-2 (1931); WIS. STAT.§ 701.10(2)(a), (d) (1971); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 4-10-
414 (2003). See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 65, § 433, n.6 for a survey of the status of 
cy pres in other jurisdictions. 
85 UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 413 (2010). "[I]n a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable 
purposes" is the standard phraseology that is meant to replace "as near as possible." This 
change may in and of itself be considered a liberalization. 
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Similarly, UPMIFA-adopted by forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands as of 201586-allows for the use of cy pres as a 
tool for modifying restrictions placed on institutional funds. 87 UPMIF A 
clarifies that "the doctrines of cy pres and deviation apply to funds held by 
nonprofit corporations as well as to funds held by charitable trusts."88 
A cy pres action begins with the trustees or directors. Once the trustees 
determine that the trust terms have become "unlawful, impracticable, 
impossible to achieve, or wasteful,"89 they file a cy pres petition seeking to 
modify the conditions. The trustees are the proper party and the only party with 
standing to seek such modifications.90 According to UPMIF A, the trustees or 
directors also "shall notify the [Attorney General] of the application, and the 
[Attorney General] must be given an opportunity to be heard"91 at the time of 
filing the petition. Once the petition has been filed, a court applies a three-part 
test to evaluate whether cy pres is appropriate. In the absence of contravening 
language in the trust itself, a court must determine that: (1) a valid charitable 
trust exists; (2) the trust's purpose is illegal, impractical, or impossible, and (3) 
the donor possessed a general charitable intent.92 If these conditions are met, 
the court will modify the terms of the trust such that they are as near as 
possible to those of the original gift.93 
86 Legislative Fact Sheet-Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, UNIFORM 
LAW COMMISSION, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Prudent%20Management%20ofO/o20 
lnstitutional%20Funds%20Act [http://perma.cc/ME4P-4T66] (listing jurisdictions that have 
adopted the UPMIFA). 
87 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(c) (2006) ("If a particular 
charitable purpose or a restriction contained in a gift instrument on the use of an institutional 
fund becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful, the court, upon 
application of an institution, may modify the purpose of the fund or the restriction on the use 
of the fund in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes expressed in the gift 
instrument."). 
88 UN!F. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT at 4 (2006). The comment to 
Uniform Trust Code § 413 states that "[t]he doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to trusts, 
but also to other types of charitable dispositions, including those to charitable corporations." 
UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 413 cmt. (2010). 
89 UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 413 (2010). 
90 In the case of restricted gifts not in the form of a trust, the beneficiary institution may 
file a cy pres petition. 
91 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6( c) (2006). 
92 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). This 
formulation has been widely adopted by courts as well. See, e.g., Kolb v. City of Storm 
Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Iowa 2007). 
93 Jn re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift, 261 P.3d 800, 809 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011) 
("Finally, in applying cy pres, courts must generally seek a purpose that conforms to the 
donor's objective 'as nearly as possible."' (quoting Am. Jur.2d § 157)). A comment to 
section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts states that the modified purpose "need not be 
the nearest possible but one reasonably similar or close to the settlor's designated purpose." 
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The first of these requirements-the valid charitable trust-has "crumbled" 
somewhat as the doctrine has been applied more regularly and courts have 
"impl[ied] a valid charitable trust where only a simple gift had been made to 
charity."94 Some scholars suggest that courts have also progressively relaxed 
the second requirement-that a trust's purpose be illegal, impractical, or 
impossible.95 Historically, courts found gift terms to be impossible or 
impracticable when the purpose was no longer available or relevant. For 
example, once the days of frontier building were clearly over, a court modified 
the conditions placed on a gift meant to "furnish relief' to immigrants and 
travelers coming to Saint Louis on their way "to settle the West. "96 Courts 
have also found certain idiosyncratic conditions-such as a bequest to 
"maintain a hospital for ailing Siamese cats"97-to be impracticable and have 
judicially modified the gift conditions in order for funds to be spent. 
More recently, courts have almost universally removed racially restrictive 
trust terms as violative of equal protection law and modified the trusts 
accordingly through the application of cy pres.98 In cases of trusts with 
religious or gender-based restrictions, courts generally assume that the donor 
would have preferred the charitable trust to continue even without the 
restrictive terms.99 For example, in Howard Savings Institution of Newark, 
N. J. v. Peep,100 the New Jersey high court used cy pres to strike conditions 
from a bequest intended to provide scholarship monies to Amherst College. 101 
The testator bequeathed money to Amherst College "to be held in trust to be 
used as a scholarship loan fund for deserving American born, Protestant, 
Gentile boys of good moral repute, not given to gambling, smoking, drinking 
or similar acts."102 Amherst refused to accept the gift with those conditions 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 67 cmt. d (2003). 
94 Chester, supra note 12, at 416. 
95 Id. (pointing out the "courts' increased willingness to discover 'impossibility' when 
confronted with what they considered a much better use of the bequest"). See also FISCH, 
supra note 31, at 139. 
96 Simes, supra note 15, at 127. 
97 Id. at 118. 
98 See David Luria, Prying Loose the Dead Hand of the Past: How Courts Apply Cy Pres 
to Race, Gender, and Religiously Restricted Trusts, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 41 (1986). David 
Luria found that out of forty cases challenging restrictive and discriminatory trusts terms, 
the courts attempted to reform the terms through the application of cy pres in twenty-nine of 
the cases. Id. at 42-43. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966); 
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1968). 
99 But see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (concluding that the trust could not be 
modified and that the trust therefore failed). 
100 170A.2d39(N.J.1961). 
101 Id. at 48 ("[W]e hold that the testator's intent can be effectuated as nearly as possible 
by striking the Protestant-Gentile restriction and turning the funds over to Amherst to be 
administered in accordance with the remaining terms and conditions of the trust."). 
102 Id. at 41. 
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attached to the scholarship, and the court concluded that "[w]ithout Amherst's 
cooperation the administration of this trust would be so impracticable as to 
defeat the general purpose of the testator."103 In a similar case in New 
Hampshire, in which scholarship money was to be given to Protestant boys, the 
state high court remarked: "[O]ur cy pres statute ... directs our courts to 
reform the illegal purpose, not to preserve it as far as possible by modifying 
those provisions requiring public administration of the trust."104 
Some commentators have remarked that "policy considerations and concern 
for furthering the public welfare [have become] of increasing importance in 
delimiting and defining the degree and type of impracticality necessary to call 
the cy pres doctrine into operation."105 Other critics have asserted that, even in 
instances of liberal interpretation, courts set too high a standard for 
determining whether a trust's terms are impossible or impractical.106 
Furthermore, critics claim that courts apply the standard inconsistently. As the 
Iowa high court observed in Kolb v. City of Storm Lake: 107 "[A] review of the 
case law on impossibility and impracticability has led many to believe 'no 
precise definition of the standard exists,' and whether something has become 
impossible or impracticable is up to the 'particular facts of each case.' We 
agree."108 
The third prong of the test is the requirement of a general charitable intent. 
The Uniform Trust Code has addressed this question and, as discussed in the 
next section, shifted the presumption in favor of general charitable intent. 
Some scholars have gone further and proposed the total elimination of this 
requirement, 109 suggesting that all charitable gifts inherently possess general 
103 Id. at 46. The testator was held to have a general charitable intent to benefit Amherst, 
his alma mater. Id. at 48. 
104 Jn re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1329 (N.H. 1990). 
105 FISCH, supra note 31, at 143. 
106 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 31, at 178 ("Major criticism has also been directed at the 
second requirement-that it must be impossible or impracticable to carry out the donor's 
purposes. Proponents of change have advocated that it should be sufficient to show that it is 
inexpedient or not in the public interest to carry out the stated purposes of the trust."). 
107 736 N. W.2d 546 (Iowa 2007). 
108 Id. at 556 (citation omitted). The court concluded that cy pres was applicable when a 
charitable trust created to build and maintain a fountain and garden at a certain location 
could no longer fulfill its terms after the city razed the garden in order to make room for a 
major economic development project. "Such a massive project should be planned in a way 
that maximizes its potential, and when the location of the garden and fountain jeopardize 
that potential it becomes impractical not to relocate them." Id. at 557. 
109 See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over: The Search for Coherence in Judicial 
Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 44 (1989) ("A court need 
not attempt to find a general charitable intent in order to apply cy pres."); Lopez, supra note 
13, (advocating for a specific charitable intent presumption, rather than the general 
charitable intent one). See also Jonathan R. Macey, The Private Creation of Private Trusts, 
3 7 EMORY L.J. 295, 306 ( 1988) (advocating for an "alternative rule which stipulates that the 
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charitable intent. Courts that do not presume general charitable intent consider 
"both the express language of the instrument, as well as extrinsic evidence."110 
General judicial procedure, in these cases, requires the application of the 
following test: "If the testator had known that it would be impossible to follow 
the express terms of the charitable bequest, would he or she prefer to bequeath 
the funds to a similar charitable purpose or have his or her largess be treated 
like all other ineffective bequests."111 The focus, critics contend, remains on 
donor intent and the undertaking is an exercise in reconstructing donor intent 
from all relevant sources, with emphasis on the agreement itself. 
II. MAPPING CY PRES REFORM 
Because of the particular way in which charitable giving regulation has 
developed, donor intent-bounded by the charitable purposes doctrine-has 
traditionally been the principle governing judicial cy pres analysis. This focus 
on donor intent has been the subject of academic critique. One commentator 
has remarked that, "[n]otwithstanding the potential for a meaningful public 
benefit, donor intent-not public interest-remains paramount in the 
administration and modification of charitable trusts."112 These critics have 
lamented the lack of meaningful reform, 113 or, relatedly, stated that reform has 
made the doctrine too confused and confusing. 114 
While scholars have consistently highlighted the shortcomings in cy pres 
doctrine and the cautious nature of reform, reform has nevertheless come. In 
the past decade, reform efforts have produced significant changes in the way 
settlor's assets always revert back to his heirs whenever any significant aspect of the 
settlor's intentions are thwarted, unless the settlor provides for a contrary result, would serve 
the interests of efficiency at least as well. Such a rule would provide a better guide to courts 
on the value to the settlor of his second choice asset allocation."). 
110 See Nat'! Soc. of Daughters of Am. Revolution v. Goodman, 736 A.2d 1205, 1210 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). 
111 Id. (citation omitted). 
112 Ilana H. Eisenstein, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes 
Foundation and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of 
Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1_747, 1754 (2003). See also Vanessa Laird, Phantom 
Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the Application of the Cy Pres 
Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REv. 973, 974 (1988) (stating that cy pres analysis is constructed to 
suggest that "whatever the court does, it does with the consent of the phantom testator"). 
113 Atkinson, supra note 13, at 97 (stating that despite this barrage of reformist activity 
and scholarship, "[t]hese calls, for all their merit, have gone virtually unheeded"). See also 
Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of 
Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres 
and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REv. 545, 567 (1989) ("Although commentators 
often have attacked the conservative approach to cy pres-pointing out its suboptimal use of 
trust assets-and have called for its expansion, courts have resisted relaxing the doctrine."). 
114 John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted Charitable Gifts, 45 
WAKEFORESTL. REV. 123, 125-26 (2010). 
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the Uniform Trust Code, the Restatement of Trusts, and some state courts 
approach the cy pres doctrine. Three reforms in particular have brought 
significant changes for cy pres doctrine. First is the shift in presumption 
concerning general charitable intent; second is the addition of "wasteful" as a 
criterion for cy pres application; and third is the use of the doctrine of 
deviation. In this Part, I describe and analyze recent high-profile cy pres cases 
that have provoked controversy, and have both exemplified the need for and 
furthered reform efforts. What emerges from this collection of litigation is a 
map of successful reform efforts as well as a blueprint for the continued 
refinement of cy pres. 
A. Fisk and the Presumption of General Charitable Intent 
The third prong of the cy pres test-the requirement of a general charitable 
intent-has provoked great debate among scholars and legal commentators. 
For many years, critics were disappointed that so little "progress ha[d] been 
made in modifying the rule requiring a general charitable intent be the 
settlor."115 Moreover, there were no more than "a few cases in the latter half of 
the twentieth century in which the courts did broaden the application of the 
doctrine by assuming general charitable intent."116 The problem with finding 
general charitable intent was clearly stated by Scott, who observed in his 
treatise: 
[T]he trust does not fail if the testator has a more general intention to 
devote the property to charitable purposes .... This principle is easy to 
state but is not always easy to apply .... Indeed it is ordinarily true that 
the testator does not contemplate the possible failure of his particular 
purpose, and all that the court can do is to make a guess not as to what he 
intended but as to what he would have intended if he had thought about 
the matter. 117 
Courts in cy pres cases were faced with a decision between allowing cy pres 
modifications or reversion to the donor's heirs. In order to make this choice, 
courts engaged in speculative inquiries about what a donor might have done 
had she still been alive or foreseen the changed circumstances. Restating why 
courts struggle to effectuate this principle, one scholar has suggested that 
traditional cy pres analysis is constructed such that "whatever the court does, it 
does with the consent of the phantom testator." 11 8 
Reform measures, however, have shifted judicial norms. In 2003, the 
Uniform Trust Code, following similar modifications to the Restatement 
115 Chester, supra note 12, at 417. Chester attributes this lack of progress to "the 
persistence of the requirement of general charitable intent, a remnant of the stress on 
individual property rights so prevalent in Anglo-American common law." Id. at 424. 
116 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 31, at 176. 
117 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§ 399.2 (3d ed. 1967). 
118 Laird, supra note 112, at 974. 
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(Third) of Trusts in 2001, modified the cy pres doctrine to include a 
presumption of general charitable intent. 119 In the comment to this section, the 
drafters remarked, "traditional doctrine did not supply that presumption, 
leaving it to the courts to determine whether the settlor had a general charitable 
intent. "120 The drafters added that "[ c ]ourts are usually able to find a general 
charitable purpose to which to apply the property, no matter how vaguely such 
purpose may have been expressed by the settlor."121 As of 2015, the Uniform 
Trust Code had been adopted by thirty-one states.122 
Even in states that have not adopted the Uniform Trust Code, courts are 
relaxing the level of proof required to show general charitable intent. This 
relaxation is not happening, however, without deliberation and contestation in 
the state courts. A good example of the difficulties stemming from the lack of a 
presumption of general charitable intent-and the extended litigation that it 
can produce-is the Fisk case. 123 Fisk University, a historically black 
university founded in 1866, was the recipient of 101 paintings that were 
donated by Georgia O'Keeffe in the late 1940s and early 1950s.124 Four of the 
paintings were the property of Georgia O'Keeffe, and the rest O'Keeffe gave 
to the school from the Alfred Steiglitz collection, in her capacity as executrix 
of his estate. 125 "All 101 pieces were charitable, conditional gifts that were 
subject to several restrictions, two of which are at issue here; the pieces could 
not be sold and the various pieces of art were to be displayed at Fisk University 
as one collection."126 
The controversy over the paintings began in 2005 when the University 
sought a Declaratory Judgment for permission to sell two valuable paintings 
from the Alfred Stieglitz Collection, Radiator Building-Night, New York by 
Georgia O'Keeffe and Painting No. 3 by Marsden Hartley. 127 As stated in the 
petition, the "purpose of the proposed sale was to generate funds for the 
University's 'business plan' to restore its endowment, improve its 
mathematics, biology, and business administration departments, and build a 
new science building."128 Before the court had rendered any judgment, the 
119 UNJF. TRUST CODE§ 413(a) (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
120 UNJF. TRUST CODE§ 413(a) cmt. at 78 (2010). 
121 Id. 
122 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
123 Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2009). For a discussion of the problems of general versus specific intent in the Fisk case, see 
Leslie, supra note 13, at 10-15. 




128 Id. For further discussion on deaccessioning and the limits imposed by industry rules 
on institutions, see Allison Anna Tait, Publicity Rules for Public Trusts, 33 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. LAW J. (forthcoming 2015). 
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University changed its request to sell the paintings into a request for approval 
of a settlement agreement with the Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art, 
in Bentonville, Arkansas. The proposed agreement provided that "the 
University would sell a 50% undivided interest in the entire Collection for $30 
million .... [and] the University and Crystal Bridges would each have the right 
to display the Collection at their respective facilities six months of each 
year."129 
In its amended complaint, the University sought relief from the conditions 
placed on the gifted paintings, pursuant to the cy pres doctrine. 130 The 
University contended that its "bleak financial circumstance" rendered 
compliance with the gift impractical, as did "other material changes in 
circumstances that have occurred in the more than fifty years since the 
conditional gifts were made."131 Applying New York law because the paintings 
had been located in New York before being bequeathed to Fisk, the Tennessee 
Chancery Court denied the University's amended request, and concluded that 
O'Keeffe had specific and not general charitable intent in giving the artwork to 
Fisk.132 
The Chancery Court began its analysis by discussing the importance of 
donor intent133 and the exact sources the court was using in order to determine 
donor intent. 134 Relying on probate documents, correspondence, and personal 
statements, the court acknowledged that "indicative of a general charitable 
intent is that the Stieglitz Will and the O'Keeffe gifts consisted of donations 
not just to Fisk but other charities."135 The Court also noted that there was no 
gift over provision in the donation. 136 However, the court also observed that 
"indicative of a specific intent are the intentions of a social statement and 
control and the proof supporting them .... "137 
Determining whether O'Keeffe's intent was general or specific, the court 
remarked that making any such determination was "elusive"138 and that "it is 
difficult to extract a concrete definition or principle to guide the Court in 
discerning in this case whether the intent is general or specific."139 The court 
also remarked, "the question whether a settlor had general charitable intent 
129 O'Keeffe, 312 S.W.3d at 5. 
130 Id. at 15. 
131 Id. 
132 See id. at 20. 
133 In re Fisk University, No. 05-2994-III, 2008 WL 5347750, at *3 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Feb. 
8, 2008) ("It is, then, critical in the first instance for a court to isolate and identify exactly 
what the donor's intent was in making a gift."). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at *7. 
136 Id. 
131 Id. 
138 Id. at *6. 
139 Id. 
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beyond the specific purpose mentioned is 'just another way of asking what the 
settlor would have done under the circumstances. "'14° Confronted with the 
question, however, the court decided that the facts of the record supported a 
finding of specific charitable intent. 141 
The Court of Appeals disagreed. 142 The appellate court stated that a donor's 
general charitable intent could be demonstrated by "other charitable gifts and 
the provisions of the gift,"143 by "similar charitable gifts to several different 
charities,"144 and "the absence of a divesting clause."145 Gift provisions stated 
that the purpose of the gift was to promote the study of art in the South, 146 and 
there were no gift over provisions. 147 In addition, 0 'Keeffe had made other 
similar charitable gifts to other charities. 148 The court also noted that, in favor 
of finding a general charitable intent, there was also the "legal principle that 
the courts favor finding a general charitable intent."149 Consequently, the court 
stated: "[T]he fact that Ms. O'Keeffe had a specific purpose and imposed 
specific conditions does not alter the fact that the motivation for the gifts to the 
University was to promote the study of art in Nashville and the South."150 The 
appellate court therefore reversed the trial court's finding and remanded the 
case to determine whether or not the University's financial straits rendered 
compliance with the gift terms impractical or impossible. 151 
On remand, the trial court concluded that financial necessity did indeed 
render compliance impossible, based on the uncontradicted testimony of Fisk's 
President, Hazel O'Leary. 152 Subsequently, the court evaluated three proposals 
for revision to the terms of the gift-two put forth by the Attorney General and 
the one put forth by the University in the amended complaint. 153 The trial court 
accepted Fisk's proposal because "(1) the superior resources of the Crystal 
Bridges Museum ... provide this important Collection excellent support and 
140 Id. at *7 (citation omitted). 
141 Id. ("[T]he Court concludes that the facts of record demonstrate that the intent was 
specific that Fisk not have the power to dispose of the Collection."). 
142 Georgia O'Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2009). 




147 Id. at 18. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 19. 
150 Id. at 18. 
151 Id. at 20. 
152 Jn re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). O'Leary discussed 
Fisk's budget cuts and financial statements while also demonstrating that that the annual 
cost to maintain and display the Collection was $131,000. Id. 
153 Id. at 591. 
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access to the public, and (2) Fisk and Crystal Bridges have modified their 
agreements to assure that the Collection retains a presence in Nashville."154 
When the litigation ended, a writer at the New York Times announced, "[t]he 
long battle over the fate of Fisk University's art collection is finally over."155 
One scholar asked: "Why did resolution of this conflict require six years of 
litigation and the expenditure of enormous amounts of charitable and public 
dollars?"156 Her answer to the question clearly implicated the cy pres doctrine, 
stating "[t]he blame lies with the law itself: the centuries-old doctrine of cy 
pres ... practically guarantee[s] that years of litigation will ensue when a 
charity finds itself unable to comply with a gift restriction."157 Confusion 
resulted from general doubt on the part of the trial court about how to apply the 
cy pres doctrine to the circumstances at hand, and, more particularly, the 
application of the general charitable intent principle. Some of the confusion 
surrounding the principle can be and has been-to the extent that states adopt 
the Uniform Trust Code-answered by a shift to the presumption of general 
charitable intent. 158 In states that have yet to adopt the Uniform Trust Code, the 
problem can be solved by the willingness of courts, like the Tennessee 
appellate court, to construe intent broadly. Consequently, the path to reform 
and the outline of a clearer standard exist within the Fisk litigation and the 
appellate court's decision. 
B. The Buck Trust and Wasteful Economic Conditions 
Fiercely debated questions concerning cy pres have also emerged in 
connection with the Buck Trust, a charitable trust that had significant surplus 
income and ran the risk of wasteful management. In the Buck case, doctrinal 
reform was the direct result of the prolonged and controversial litigation. 159 
Beryl Buck established the Beryl Buck Foundation Trust by bequest in 
1975.160 Buck's will directed that the trust "shall always be held and used for 
exclusively non-profit charitable, religious or educational purposes in 
providing care for the needy in Marin County, California, and for other non-
154 Id. 
155 Randy Kennedy, Legal Battle Over Fisk University Art Collection Ends, N. Y. TIMES, 
August 3, 2012, at C2. 
156 Leslie, supra note 13, at 3. 
157 Id. at 3-4 ("In the Fisk case, the law's fuzziness allowed the [O'Keeffe] Museum-an 
unrelated third party-to make a grab for the Collection under the guise of effectuating 
donor's intent. The fact-specific cy pres standard also enabled the Tennessee Attorney 
General to make it extraordinarily difficult for Fisk to craft a solution involving entities 
located outside the state of Tennessee."). 
158 Leslie, supra note 13, at 5 ("[A]pplication of certain UTC provisions to the Fisk case 
would have reduced the length of the litigation and the corresponding waste of charitable 
assets, to some degree."). 
159 Estate of Buck, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
160 Id. at 442. 
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profit charitable, religious or educational purposes in that county." 161 At the 
time of Buck's death, the assets-in the form of Belridge Oil stock-were 
worth approximately ten million dollars. 162 Four years later, however, when 
Shell Oil bought Belridge, oil prices had soared and the trust assets became 
worth almost 300 million dollars. 163 
Faced with this unexpected and dramatic increase in trust assets, the 
distribution committee deliberated about how to disburse funds in light of trust 
terms requiring that the spendable income be used in Marin County, a county 
with "one of the highest per capita incomes in the country and relatively few 
charitable needs."164 Ultimately, the committee, in 1984, "resolved that it was 
'impracticable and inexpedient to continue to expend all of the income from 
the Buck Trust solely within Marin County' and authorized the filing of a 
petition to modify the geographic restriction of Beryl Buck's Trust."165 The 
Foundation, in its cy pres petition, requested authorization to "spend an 
unspecified portion of Buck Trust income outside of Marin County in the four 
other Bay Area counties preferentially served by the Foundation."166 
Once the Foundation filed its petition, a frenzied debate began. John Simon, 
capturing the over-the-top tenor of the response, recounted that "[t]he petition 
was characterized as a threat to the sanctity of wills and the health of 
philanthropy, and as an offense against capitalism, the American way of life, 
and God."167 A number of motions to intervene were filed, including one by 
the Marin County Bar Association and another by a self-described collection of 
"46 Objector Beneficiaries."168 The University of California, Solano County, 
Mendocino County, and Sonoma County all sought to intervene solely on the 
question of whether the court should apply cy pres.169 
In the briefs prepared for trial, the Foundation argued that modification of 
the gift conditions was appropriate "on the basis of unanticipated changed 
circumstances, or 'surprise,' and 'inefficiency. "'170 The opposing side argued 
that there were no legal grounds on which to grant cy pres, that there was no 
"surprise," that Buck's intention was to limit expenditures to Marin County 
161 Id. at 443. 
162 Ronald Hayes Malone, Mary K. McEachron & Jay M. Cutler, The Buck Trust Trial-
A Litigator's Perspective, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 590 (1987) ("Mrs. Buck's trust was worth 
ten million dollars at the time of her death but $260 million by the close of probate and over 
$400 million at the time of trial."). 
163 Id. 
164 Malone et al., supra note 162, at 590-91. 
165 Id. at 591. 
166 Id. 
167 John G. Simon, American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 
641 (1987). 
168 Malone et al., supra note 162, at 594. 
169 Id. at 594-95. 
170 Id. at 609. 
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regardless of the value of the trust, and that "any perceived 'inefficiency' or 
'ineffectiveness' was attributable to the Foundation's conflicts of interest and 
improper administration of the Buck Trust, not the Trust's terms, its value, or 
the nature of Marin County."171 On August 15, 1986, the court entered a 
judgment denying the cy pres petition. 172 The court concluded that the 
Foundation had not proved that it was impossible, illegal, or impracticable, to 
spend the trust income as directed in the trust terms. 173 The court also 
concluded that "[ n ]either inefficiency nor ineffective philanthropy constitutes 
impracticability, nor does either concept constitute an appropriate standard for 
the application of cy pres."174 The court did, however, agree to hold a hearing 
in July 1987 in order to select one or more of the "major projects" to be 
funded, and in August of that year the court directed trust funds be distributed 
to three "major projects": The Buck Center on Aging, Institute on Alcohol and 
Other Drug Problems, and Marin Educational Institute. 175 In addition, the court 
appointed a special master to oversee the progress of these projects and 
ordered a "review [of] the progress and operations of each major project 
annually."176 
Thus ended a prolonged process that included a six-month trial that 
produced nearly 15,000 pages of trial transcript and over 2000 trial exhibits.177 
Because of the publicity surrounding the case as well as the investment of 
resources in litigating the case, some called it the "Superbowl of Probate."178 
Severe dissatisfaction with the length and expense of the litigation, as well as 
the outcome, also provoked reformers to advocate for the inclusion of the 
concept of wastefulness as a criterion for the application of cy pres. Invoking 
the example of the Buck Trust, reformer advocates argued that "the legal right 
to dictate through a trust how wealth is to be used after death may lead to 
economic inefficiency because conditions inevitably will change in ways 
unforeseen to the settlor."179 
The result of this activity was modification to the Uniform Trust Code in 
2000 and to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts in 2003. The Restatement states 
that cy pres may be appropriate when it "becomes wasteful to apply all of the 
property to the designated purpose."180 The Restatement describes "wasteful" 
as meaning that the funds far exceed what is necessary, rendering it imprudent 
111 Id. 
172 Id. at 636 (citing Jn re Estate of Buck, No. 23259, slip op. at 10-11 (Cal. Super. Ct., 
Marin County, Aug. 15, 1986)). 
113 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 639 n.284. 
176 Simon, supra note 167, at 661. 
177 Malone et al., supra note 162, at 610. 
178 See id. at 637. 
179 Macey, supra note 109, at 297. 
180 RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
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not to expand the purposes for which the funds can be applied. 181 The revised 
Uniform Trust Code provisions state, "the court may modify an administrative 
term if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be impracticable, 
wasteful, or impair the trust's administration." The Uniform Trust Code 
revision therefore "expands the ability of the court to apply cy pres."182 The 
Uniform Trust Code also, for efficiency reasons, sets forth expedited 
procedures for reforming small charitable trusts. 183 A trustee may modify or 
terminate a trust with assets less than $50,000 "if the trustee concludes that the 
value of the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of 
administration."184 Fourteen states have enacted statutes providing for similar 
procedures. 185 
Although these reforms were unavailable to help in the resolution of the 
Buck Trust case, the reforms may help with other trusts that are generating 
more income than they can spend. For example, a cy pres challenge has yet to 
come for the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate Trust ("KSBET"). 186 Alex 
Johnson has remarked that the "KSBET presents a classic example of a trust in 
need of modification via the cy pres doctrine to conform to conditions that 
have changed since it was established by the will of Princess Bernice Pauahi 
Bishop over 114 years ago." 187 Aside from significant concerns about trustee 
abuse of power, l88 a major concern is the efficient utilization of the trust's 
181 See id. § 67 cmt. c(l) ("The term 'wasteful' is used here neither in the sense of 
common-law waste nor to suggest that a lesser standard of merely 'better use' will 
suffice."). The Uniform Trust Code was amended in 2001. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 31, 
at 177 n.283. Arizona, Nebraska, New Mexico and Wyoming have adopted the Uniform 
Trust Code. Id. at 177 n.287. Delaware also includes the language about wasteful purpose in 
its cy pres statute. Id. at 178. These changes may have come in response to criticism in the 
wake oflegal disputes involving the Buck Trust and the Hershey Trust. 
182 David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000) and its Application to Ohio, 30 
CAP. U. L. REV. I, 18 (2002). 
183 FREMONT -SMITH, supra note 31, at I 79. 
184 See UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 414(a). 
185 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 31, at 179-80. 
186 The Trust has faced other legal challenges, including equal protection challenges to 
the discriminatory admission policies. See Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bemice Pauahi Bishop 
Estate, 470 F.3d 827, 827 (9th Cir. 2006). 
187 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding 
the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 353, 353 (1999). 
188 In 1999, the trust was "embroiled in a public tangle of boardroom intrigue, 
questionable investments, IRS audits and allegations of criminal acts." Hawaii Trustees 
Plagued by Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1999), 
http://articles.latimes.com/ J 999/mar/29/news/mn-22203 [http://perma.cc/6LPF-YK99). All 
five trustees were, at that time, removed from office "after the Internal Revenue Service 
threatened to strip the estate of its status as a tax-free charitable organization." Samuel P. 
King & Randall W. Roth, Erosion of Trust. Hawaii's Bishop Estate: A Cautionary Tale of 
Mismanagement at a Charitable Organization, 93 A.B.A. J. 48, 49 (2007). The Bishop 
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income. Johnson has speculated that, "[i]f all the money . . . was spent to 
support the Kamehameha Schools ... trustees would have to come up with 
creative ways to spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to benefit a 
high school when such expenditures may be unnecessary, wasteful, and 
downright stupid."189 
Similar questions about the amount spent per student have been asked about 
the Hershey Trust Company and Milton Hershey School. This trust "has 
yielded an embarrassment of riches, which now includes almost $800 million 
in accumulated income, far more than the school needs for its 1, 163 students, 
who receive free room, board, clothes, books, bikes and backpacks."190 
However, in 2002 when the school announced a plan to diversify the trust's 
investment portfolio by selling its controlling interest in the Hershey Company, 
public outrage was immediate. 191 Although the Company's stock jumped 
almost fifteen dollars based on news of the sale, the Attorney General-who 
was running for Governor--obtained a preliminary injunction, and the trustees 
abandoned the sale, causing the stock price to drop back down. 192 Robert 
Sitkoff and Jonathan Klick have argued that "the Attorney General's 
intervention preserved charitable trust agency costs on the order of roughly 
$850 million and foreclosed salutary portfolio diversification."193 They further 
estimate that the blocked sale "destroyed roughly $2.7 billion in shareholder 
wealth, reducing aggregate social welfare by preserving a suboptimal 
ownership structure of the Hershey Company."194 
The Hershey Trust, like the Bishop Estate, may present an opportunity for 
cy pres modification, depending on whether petitioners can prove that the 
income of each trust is excessive to its purpose. If income is excessive, as it 
was in the Buck case, petitioners may be able to leverage the concept of 
"wasteful" to facilitate amendment of trust terms. Consequently, introducing 
Estate "has been referred to as 'the Enron of charities."' Id. at 50. 
189 Johnson, supra note 187 at 362. 
190 Tamar Lewin, Alumni Fight for 'Soul' of Richest Orphanage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/l l/30/us/alumni-fight-for-soul-of-richest-
orphanage.html [http://perma.cc/KC4S-FCN9]. 
191 See Jennifer L. Komoroski, The Hershey Trust's Quest to Diversify: Redefining the 
State Attorney General's Role When Charitable Trusts Wish to Diversify, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 1769, 1787 (2004) ("[T]he Pennsylvania Attorney General, in his parens patriae 
role, sought to block the sale by petitioning a court to order the trustees of the Hershey Trust 
to show cause as to why the sale of the trust's controlling interest in Hershey Foods should 
not require court approval."). 
192 Robert H. Sitkoff & Jonathan Klick, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate 
Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off, I 08 CO LUM. L. REV. 749, 749 (2009). Sitko ff 
and Klick remark that many of the problems in this case may have resulted from the 
Attorney General's desire to use the Hershey Trust situation to further his personal agenda 
as a political candidate. Id. at 781-82. 
193 Id. at 749. 
194 Id. 
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the concept of economic waste into cy pres analysis has been an important 
reform and provided trustees and nonprofit institutions with a new tool for 
obtaining increased spending flexibility. 
C. The Barnes Trust and the Doctrine of Deviation 
Another highly publicized and hotly contested case, the Barnes Trust case, 
has highlighted the utility of a related change of circumstances doctrine, the 
doctrine of deviation and reform to that doctrine. 195 The doctrine of deviation, 
applicable to both charitable and private trusts, allows a court to "modify an 
administrative or distributive provision of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee 
to deviate from an administrative or distributive provision, if because of 
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation will 
further the purposes of the trust." 196 The provision allowing for deviation from 
distributive provisions was a major change brought about by section 167 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, and was not found in prior law. This change 
concerning distributive provisions influenced language in the Uniform Trust 
Code as well. The current version of the Uniform Trust Code states, "[t]he 
court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or terminate 
the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, 
modification or termination will further the purposes of the trust." 197 The main 
difference between cy pres and deviation is that the latter is considered to be a 
more liberal tool in reforming charitable trust terms. 198 "Courts appear to apply 
the deviation doctrine in situations short of impossibility, particularly when 
'effective philanthropy' or the public interest is paramount."199 Deviation is 
therefore another useful tool for institutions looking to increase their flexibility 
and ability to modify gift conditions. 
In the case of the Barnes Trust, the deviation doctrine was used to make 
significant changes to the trust terms, changes that highlight the extent to 
which deviation can reform a trust using the language of administrative 
change.200 The Barnes Trust was formed by Albert Barnes, a physician and art 
195 Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 500 (Pa. 1960). 
196 RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTRUSTS § 66(1) (2003). 
197 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (emphasis added) ('To the extent practicable, the 
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor's probable intention."). In the 
comment to this section, the drafters added that "(t]he purpose of the 'equitable deviation' 
authorized by subsection (a) is not to disregard the settlor's intent but to modify inopportune 
details to effectuate better the settlor's broader purposes." Id. cmt. 
198 Johnson, supra note 187, at 354 ("[C]ourts can rather arbitrarily determine ex ante the 
outcome of a particular dispute or litigation by simply characterizing a proposed change in a 
trust's operation or management as administrative (calling for the liberal doctrine of 
deviation) or as substantive (calling for the much narrower doctrine of cy pres)."). 
199 Id. at 3 75. 
200 See In re Barnes Foundation, No. 58, 788, 2004 WL 2903655, at * 1 (Pa. Ct. of 
Common Pleas Dec. 13, 2004). 
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collector, on his property in Lower Merion, just outside of Philadelphia. 201 He 
collected primarily French Impressionist and Post-Impressionist pieces, but 
owned "about two thousand works in all, by artists ranging from EI Greco and 
Rubens to Miro and Modigliani."202 As Barry Munitz, the president of the J. 
Paul Getty Trust, puts it, "[t]here are some of the most spectacular paintings 
that the world has ever seen."203 Aside from the quality of the collection, the 
Barnes collection may be most well known for the restrictions placed on the 
artwork. 
The 1946 bylaws to the trust indenture drafted by Barnes, an adamant (and 
eccentric) populist, stated that "plain people, that is, men and women who gain 
their livelihood by daily toil in shops, factories, schools, stores and similar 
places, shall have free access to the art gallery and the arboretum upon those 
days when the gallery and the arboretum are to be open to the public."204 
Barnes insisted that the "purpose of this gift is democratic and educational in 
the true meaning of those words, and special privileges are forbidden."205 
Accordingly, Barnes prohibited any "society functions commonly designated 
receptions, tea parties, dinners, banquets, dances, musicales or similar 
affairs .... "206 Barnes also prohibited the sale or loan of any of the artworks 
and specified that "[a]II paintings shall remain in exactly the places they are at 
the time of the death of Donor and his said wife."207 
When Barnes died in 1951, the legal challenges began almost immediately. 
The first challenges were not cy pres ones, however: these first lawsuits sought 
not to change the trust terms, but to enforce them. In 1953, an editorial writer 
from the Philadelphia Inquirer, with the consent of the Attorney General, 
sought to compel the alteration of the Barnes' administrative rules allegedly 
limiting access of public to institution's art gallery.208 The plaintiff filed a bill 
in equity for administrative change: "Appellant's bill does not seek application 
of the cy pres doctrine because of alleged failure of the trust, but complains of 
the manner in which the Foundation is being administered as being violative of 
its corporate purposes."209 The court dismissed the complaint for lack of 
standing. Seven years later, however, the standing question was resolved when 
the Attorney General acting on his own filed a new petition requesting that the 
201 John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, the Public Interest, and 
Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 477, 477-78 (2003). 
202 Jeffrey Toobin, Battle for the Barnes, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2002, at 34. 
203 Id. 
204 Barnes Foundation Bylaws, BARNESWATCH.ORG, 




208 Wiegand v. Barnes Found., 97 A.2d 81, 81 (Pa. 1953). 
209 Id. at 84. The bill was denied by the trial court and appealed to the state supreme 
court. Id. at 81-82. 
1696 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1663 
Barnes Foundation allow public access to the artwork "in accordance with the 
terms of the indenture."210 Because of the trust terms stating that all people 
were to have free access to the art gallery and because the Foundation was 
receiving the benefits accorded to a public charity, the court ruled that the 
collection was obligated to provide public access to the artwork.211 
Litigation did not end there. The claims that followed, however, sought to 
modify trust terms. Over the years an "extensive litigation history and the 
significant expense of maintaining an increasingly valuable collection" caused 
financial problems for the Barnes Foundation.212 Foundation trustees 
bemoaned "their inability to fundraise because of the limitations on public 
access, the small size of the board, the inability to deaccession works from the 
collection, and the constant costs of litigation."213 Moreover, pursuant to the 
trust terms, the Foundation still did not charge entrance fees to visitors. In 
2003, in response to distressed financial circumstances, the trustees filed a 
petition to restructure the Foundation Board and relocate the collection from 
Lower Merion to Philadelphia in conjunction with the acceptance of a proposal 
from the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Lenfest Foundation.214 Pew and 
Lenfest offered $150 million to "ensure the Foundation's long-term financial 
health," conditioned on the collection's move into Philadelphia.215 
Specifically, the Foundation trustees requested that the court "remove 
restrictions in the current [indenture, charter, and bylaws] that prevent 
relocation of the Foundation's main gallery from the Merion facility to 
Philadelphia."216 They further requested that the court "remove some of the 
conditions and stipulations set forth in the present Indenture that restrict the 
Foundation. The Foundation will therefore have the flexibility in the future to 
manage its affairs in accordance with its best professional and business 
judgment."217 In making these requests, the trustees also reiterated that "[n]one 
of the proposed changes would alter the Foundation's existence as an 
educational institution. "218 
21° Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 501 (Pa. 1960). The indenture 
provided that "plain people ... shall have free access to the art gallery and the arboretum 
upon those days when the gallery and the arboretum are to be open to the public." Instead, 
the court remarked that "officers and trustees have consistently refused to the public 
admission to its art gallery." Id. at 502. 
211 Id. at 506. 
212 Eisenstein, supra note 112, at 1751. 
213 Id. at 1752. 
214 Second Amended Petition of the Barnes Foundation to Amend its Charter and Bylaws 
at 9, In re Barnes Found., No 58,788 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas Oct. 21, 2003), 
http://www.bamesfriends.org/downlload/2nd _amended _petition_ barnes.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/24YE-LEEE]. 
215 Id. at 5. 
216 Id. at 9. 
211 Id. 
218 Id. at 10. 
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Using the doctrine of deviation, the court granted the Foundation's requests 
based on the Foundation's financial circumstances.219 Addressing the question 
of relocation and citing to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court stated 
"that the provision in Dr. Barnes' indenture mandating that the gallery be 
maintained in Merion was not sacrosanct, and could yield under the 'doctrine 
of deviation, '"220 provided that the proposed solution "represented the least 
drastic modification of the indenture that would accomplish the donor's 
desired ends."221 The court did not discuss the applicability of cy pres, and 
allowed significant changes by deploying the doctrine of deviation. Deviation, 
however, produced a similar result because, doctrinally, it resembles cy pres in 
the premise. That is to say, the implied conclusion was that Barnes had a 
general charitable intent to found a museum and the court therefore struck out 
the offending terms in the trust in order to carry out this dominant intent.222 
Opposition to the petition and the resulting decision was immediate and 
intense. The Board of Commissioners of Lower Merion Township passed a 
resolution stating that the Barnes Foundation was "part of the fabric, character 
and culture of Lower Merion Township" and any change in location was "in 
direct contravention of the intent and purpose of Albert Bames."223 Some 
commentators criticized the proposal, calling it "death by disembowelment"224 
and an "act of cultural vandalism."225 Despite all the turmoil,226 over a decade 
219 Jn re Barnes Foundation, No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *l (Pa. Ct. of Common 
Pleas Dec. 13, 2004). 
no Id. 
221 Id. (citation omitted) 
222 See generally id. 
223 Lower Merion Board of Commissioners, Resolution of the Board of Commissioners of 
the Township of Lower Merion, FRIENDS OF THE BARNES FOUNDATION, 
http://www.barnesfriends.org/downlload/legal_LowerMerionResolution.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/X64K-4K3A]. 
224 Robin Pogrebin, A Move Done, Barnes Leader Makes Another, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 
2013, at Cl (quoting Richard Lacayo, We Had to Destroy the Village to Save It, TIME, Mar. 
6, 2007). 
225 Id. (quoting Michael J. Lewis, Art for Sale, COMMENTARY (Mar. 1, 2006), 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/art-for-sale/[http://perma.cc/R72N-3ZCQ]). 
226 The legal battles did not stop after the 2004 ruling. The group "Friends of the Barnes" 
filed a petition to reopen the proceedings in 2007. See In re Barnes Foundation, No. 58,788 
(Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas May 15, 2008) (mem.), available at 
http://www.barnesfriends.org/downlload/Memo%200pinion%2005-15-08.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4L VL-PW AN]. Although the court dismissed their petition for lack of 
standing, Friends of the Barnes filed another petition to reopen the case in 2011. In their 
second petition, Friends of the Barnes again argued that new information about funding had 
been revealed, this time in the movie "The Art of the Steal." Petition to Reopen the Matter 
Based on Newly Discovered Evidence of Improper Conduct Not Known During the Time of 
Trial filed by the Attorney General and the Governor of Pennsylvania, Jn re Barnes 
Foundation, No. 58,788 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas Feb. 17, 2011), available at 
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after the Foundation filed the petition to amend the terms of Barnes's trust 
indenture, the collection moved to Philadelphia and opened to the public in its 
new location. The galleries were, according to art commentators, "recreated 
with amazing fidelity in terms of proportions, window placement and 
finishings, albeit in a slightly more modern style. The structure is oriented to 
the south, exactly as in Merion; the same mustard-colored burlap covers the 
walls; the same plain wood molding outlines doors and baseboards."227 All the 
paintings were placed in the same arrangements as in their previous home, and 
the New York Times art critic raved that "Barnes's exuberant vision of art as a 
relatively egalitarian aggregate of the fine, the decorative and the functional 
comes across more clearly, justifying its perpetuation with a new force."228 
Although the doctrine of deviation does not constitute cy pres, the doctrine 
has nonetheless provided a way for charitable organizations to circumvent the 
more stringent cy pres requirements. The boundaries between the two doctrines 
have also blurred, such that the lower threshold required to satisfy the 
deviation standard may be creating change within cy pres as the two doctrines 
come to more closely resemble one another. Alex Johnson has proposed that 
deviation and cy pres doctrines be merged and "treated, for all intents and 
purposes, as the same. In other words, courts should employ the same test to 
determine whether to change terms and conditions of so-called administrative 
or substantive provisions of a charitable trust .... "229 Likewise, Ronald 
Chester has remarked that cy pres may become obsolete because the events 
that trigger deviation are the same that trigger cy pres.230 The use of deviation, 
http://www.barnesfriends.org/downlload/Barnes%20(Petition).pdf [http://perma.cc/CP8F-
LANN]. The court sustained preliminary objections to the petition. Furthermore, the court 
imposed sanctions on the petitioners. In re Barnes Foundation, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order Sur Preliminary Objections to Petitions to Reopen, No. 58,788 (Pa. Ct. of Common 
Pleas Oct. 6, 2011 ), available at 
http://www.barnesfriends.org/downlload/tbf_ 100611 _ barnes _opinion judge_ ott.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2YDC-YY 48]. 
227 Roberta Smith, A Museum, Reborn, Remains True to Its Old Self, Only Better, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 17, 2012, at Al. Other critics disagreed. See Jed Perl, The Barnes Foundation's 
Disastrous New Home, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106435/bames-foundation-
move-philadelphia-tod-williams-billie-tsien [http://perma.cc/PKT9-KU9T] ("The Barnes 
Foundation, that grand old curmudgeonly lion of a museum, has been turned into what may 
be the world's most elegant petting zoo."). Critics point out that an overlooked result of the 
move is that most of the collection cannot be displayed and there are hundreds of exhibition-
quality paintings in the vault. 
228 Smith, supra note 227. 
229 Johnson, supra note 187, at 354. 
230 Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in The 21st Century: The 
Uniform Trust Code Leads A Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 709 
(2001) ("Events that make continuation of the trust as is impracticable, impossible, illegal or 
wasteful seem to be just the types of unanticipated circumstances necessary to trigger 
section 411." (internal quotations omitted)). 
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consequently, is an important reform--one that impacts cy pres-and another 
tool for nonprofit institutions seeking gift modifications. 
III. GIVING GIFTS IN THE CHARITABLE ECONOMY 
Cy pres reform-grounded in modifications to the Uniform Trust Code and 
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and making its way into judicial analysis-
has changed the doctrine. Reforms have decreased the guesswork for courts 
with respect to donor intent, created room for concepts of economic waste and 
efficiency, and focused on facilitating the better administration of charitable 
gifts. Still missing, however, is a theory to explain the nature of charitable 
property and therefore fully account for the correctness of these reforms. 
Anti-dead-hand theory-the idea that posthumous control over property 
should be subject to restriction for (primarily) efficiency purposes-provides 
an important rationale for limiting the scope of donor control. Removing 
value-impairing conditions enables greater alienability of property (particularly 
in the private trust context) and increases the efficient use of all property and 
assets held in trust.231 Anti-dead-hand policy enables an increase in efficiency 
because it "is fundamentally a change-of-circumstances doctrine"232 that 
explains why gift conditions should not control in all circumstances. What 
anti-dead-hand theory does not address is the particular nature of charitable 
gifts and why, fundamentally, charitable trust property should be treated 
differently than other types of property. 
In this Part, I set forth the idea that charitable giving takes place within what 
I call the charitable gift economy-an economy driven by non-market 
exchanges and social norms. In the charitable gift economy (a concept derived 
from both anthropological and economic scholarship) gift giving is a form of 
exchange that is not merely bilateral, but is embedded in a constellation of 
culturally relevant relationships. Understanding charitable giving within the 
gift economy allows us to see why cy pres reforms are a positive step in the 
right direction. Donors receive multiple social goods in the gift economy 
during their lifetimes, and this receipt justifies the liberalization of the cy pres 
doctrine. Once we fully understand what the donor receives in the charitable 
gift economy, then, we also understand that making deviations beyond a 
donor's lifetime is as understandable as it is often necessary. The donor, in 
short, has received her due. 
Legal scholars have begun to broach this question by addressing the tax 
benefits that donors receive. Scholars have suggested that a charitable bargain 
exists between the donor and the public, mediated through institutions and the 
231 See SIMES, supra note 15; Langbein, supra note 15. See also T.P. Gallanis, The Rule 
Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission 's Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
284 (2000) (critiquing Simes). For an overview of dead-hand restraints, see Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189, 1261-62 (1985). 
232 Langbein, supra note 15, at 1111. 
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government. While this understanding of donor benefits and charitable giving 
is apt, it is nonetheless incomplete. I begin this Part by explaining the tax 
intervention and the current reasoning deployed by scholars to justify cy pres 
liberalization. Subsequently, I discuss charitable giving as part of a complex 
gift economy and detail the myriad tangible and intangible benefits that donors 
receive from their giving. Finally, I propose further reforms based on the 
understanding that the charitable gift economy provides donors with a range of 
plentiful benefits during their lifetime. 
A. The Modern Charitable Bargain 
While the Dartmouth case and its progeny established the charitable gift as 
an implied contract-an exchange of resources for a perpetual legacy233- the 
modem charitable bargain is better defined. The major concrete benefit that 
donors now receive through their charitable giving is preferential tax 
treatment.234 Since the introduction of the charitable deduction in 1917, an 
individual has been allowed to deduct charitable contributions, subject to 
certain limitations.235 Donors receive a tax deduction on personal income taxes 
for making charitable gifts, in the form of established trusts, as lifetime gifts, 
and as bequests.236 Donors can deduct up to fifty percent of their annual 
adjusted gross income in charitable gifts and can also take carryover gift 
deductions for five years.237 This includes gifts made as charitable trusts, for 
which donors can take a tax deduction at the time the trust is created.238 
233 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
234 There is a longstanding debate among tax policy scholars about whether the charitable 
contribution should be classified as a tax "preference" or whether a deduction for charitable 
contributions instead is necessary to define the income tax base. See William Andrews, 
Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 314 (1972). 
235 The deduction is codified at l.R.C. § 170 (2012). I.R.C. § l 70(c)(2) defines entities to 
which deductible contributions may be made. Congress first adopted a contributions 
deduction in 1917. War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). 
Until the mid-1950s, the code limited most people to a deduction equal to fifteen 
percent of their income; this limit rose to thirty percent in 1954 and remained at that 
level until 1969. Also prior to 1969, individuals whose charitable gifts and income 
taxes together surpassed ninety percent of their taxable income in eight of the ten 
preceding years were allowed an unlimited deduction .... Also in 1969, the general 
AGI limit rose to its current level of fifty percent. 
Miranda Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 165, 171-72 (2008); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 411 (7th ed. 2013) ("Although Congress 
provides incentives for individuals to donate significant portions of their income to charities, 
it does not believe individuals should be permitted to eliminate their tax liability entirely ... 
. "). 
236 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
237 See I.R.C. § l 70(b )(I )(A), (b )(I )(0)(2). 
238 See I.R.C. § 170( c )(2). 
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Donors plan their charitable giving strategically through the use of planned 
giving vehicles-primarily various forms of split-interest trusts-in order to 
minimize the impact and consequences of the estate tax.239 One fundraising 
strategist has remarked, "[t]ax and financial considerations are very important 
to [charitable trust donors]" and "[m]arketing materials for the very wealthy 
should contain tax and financial information."24° Following this advice, many 
institutions emphasize the tax benefits of a donor's charitable gift, especially in 
the context of charitable trusts and planned giving.241 
This preferential tax treatment provides a very significant, tangible benefit 
to donors. Unsurprisingly, numerous studies show that "awareness of tax 
advantage" is a prominent reason that donors make charitable gifts.242 In fact, 
studies about donor motivation in making charitable contributions reveal that 
tax benefit is almost always one of the top three reasons donors give major 
gifts.243 Similarly, studies reveal that "[o]ne thing that donors clearly do not 
want is to see their wealth pass to the government through taxes."244 
In light of this major benefit accorded to charitable donors, some scholars 
highlight the existence of a charitable bargain or contract between the donor 
and the public. For example, discussing donor tax treatment, Alex Johnson has 
239 The estate tax was enacted in 1916. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH 
BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2006) (providing an 
overview of the estate tax and the current contestation); see also OSTROWER, supra note 20, 
at 103-04. 
240 David W. Brown, What Research Tells us About Planned Giving, 9 INT. J. NONPROFIT 
& VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING 86, 93 (2003). 
241 For example, the Museum of Modem Art advertises "planned giving options that 
have favorable financial and tax benefits." Museum of Modern Art, Ways of Giving, 
MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, 
http://www.moma.org/support/support _the_ museum/planned _giving/index 
[http://perma.cc/M5MA-9NLQ] ; Harvard University likewise touts the tax benefits of 
establishing a charitable remainder trust. See Planned Giving: Charitable Remainder Trusts, 
HARVARD UNIV., http://alumni.harvard.edu/ways-to-give/planned-giving/pay-income/crt 
[http://perma.cc/N6Q6-QV6Y]. 
242 Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK 568, 569 (Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell eds., 2006). See also Mount, 
supra note 21, at 7, 12 (concluding that tax incentives may influence the size of the 
donation). 
243 See Vesterlund, supra note 242, at 569 ("Data from a survey of 200 big donors are 
suggestive of the impact that taxes have on giving .... This study revealed that 'awareness 
of tax advantages' was ranked the third most important motivator for making a charitable 
donation."). The survey cited is found in Russ ALAN PRINCE & KAREN MARU FILE, THE 
SEVEN FACES OF PHILANTHROPY: A NEW APPROACH TO CULTIVATING MAJOR DONORS 45-46 
(1994) ("Investors tend to believe that much, if not all, the monies they give nonprofits 
would otherwise be diverted to government in the form of taxes. Tax avoidance alone is a 
powerful motivator to this group, and a significant stimulus to their philanthropic 
behavior."). 
244 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at IOI. 
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observed that, "by establishing a charitable trust, the settlor has entered into a 
contract ... [that] provides tangible and intangible benefits to the settlor and 
tangible benefits to society."245 Similarly adverting to an implied if imperfect 
bargain between donor and public, another scholar has remarked, "[ c ]haritable 
trusts receive enormous benefits from the public, justified by the public nature 
of the trust itself. The law does not require any proportionality between the 
benefits-tax exemption, existence in perpetuity, and public enforcement-and 
actual service to the public."246 Scholars have therefore adverted to the 
substantial benefits that donors receive in the form of both preferential tax 
treatment and exemption from the rule against perpetuities. Furthermore, they 
have marshaled these facts to support the liberalization of cy pres analysis. The 
picture, how~ver, remains incomplete. 
B. Completing the Picture of Charitable Giving 
To complete the picture, we need to understand charitable giving as situated 
in a complex gift economy. This requires more than understanding the concept 
of the charitable bargain to include tax benefits. We must reimagine our 
conception of gift-giving; it is not solely a bilateral exchange with easily-
definable, material benefits accruing to each party. Rather, gift-giving is a 
complicated form of exchange that provides a donor with numerous intangible 
benefits and operates within an intricate system of social networks and cultural 
norms. Ilana Eisenstein describes this more complete notion of the gift 
economy, stating that "the donation calculus" includes factors such as "tax 
incentives, absolute levels of wealth, 'old money' cultural norms, individual 
morality and altruism, and the desire for social power and prestige."247 A full 
theory of this gift economy, however, has yet to be imported into trust law. 
Anthropologists and sociologists pioneered the concept of the gift as a form 
of exchange. Marcel Mauss, in his seminal anthropological study, elucidated 
how gifts are in fact deployed to create informal contracts, cement social 
exchanges, and clarify intra-group relationships.248 According to Mauss and his 
followers, gifts are a form of currency and they allow members of certain 
communities and societies to signal not only appreciation or gratitude, but also 
kinship, obligation, and even superiority.249 Contrasting participants in the gift 
economies with those in commodity economies, Mauss observes that: 
245 Johnson, supra note 187, at 387. Other scholars discuss the existence of a charitable 
bargain but maintain the focus on perpetuity in exchange for gifts. See, e.g., Eason, supra 
note 114, at 124 ("Society has thus struck a more conciliatory bargain with donors who 
contribute their property in furtherance of such public purposes. Societal concessions to 
charitable donors, in other words, permit these donors to exercise a degree of perpetual 
control over the use of contributed property in ways otherwise foreclosed by law."). 
246 Eisenstein, supra note 112, at 1786. 
247 Id. at 1758-59. 
248 See generally MAUSS, supra note 1. 
249 Id. at 6-7. 
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[W]hat they exchange is not solely property and wealth, movable and 
immovable goods, and things economically useful. In particular, such 
exchanges are acts of politeness: banquets, rituals, military services, 
women, children, dances, festivals, and fairs, in which economic 
transaction is only one element, and in which passing on of wealth is only 
one feature of a much more general and enduring contract.250 
Economists as well as law and economics scholars have also debated what 
motivates gift giving and how gift giving constitutes a subtle form of 
exchange. Eric Posner has observed, with respect to non-charitable gifts, that 
"a gift to a friend often calls for a return gift on a future occasion, or at least 
expressions of gratitude; a gift to a business associate frequently creates the 
expectation of future dealings; and a gift to a politician generally requires the 
politician to show some favoritism to the donor in return."251 Economists have 
also studied charitable giving, in particular, in an attempt to explain why 
individuals make charitable gifts when the economic return is absent and any 
other return is non-obvious.252 
Sociologists have likewise studied the reasons why donors choose to make 
charitable gifts. Building on Veblen, who posited that participation in 
charitable activities constituted a part of conspicuous leisure and signaled 
social class belonging,253 sociologists focus on the nexus of non-economic 
exchanges in which charitable gifts are embedded and the social norms that 
govern these exchanges. Francie Ostrower states that "[g]ift exchange has been 
interpreted as a symbolic representation of the relationships among the 
individuals who exchange gifts. Philanthropic gifts are also expressive of 
relationships, but they express the individual's relationship to, and 
identification with, particular social groups."254 Motivated by the more 
practical concern of raising money, fundraising experts and leaders have also 
delved into analyzing which benefits are most attractive to donors with an eye 
to better design in fundraising programs.255 The sections that follow explain 
exactly how charitable gifts act as a multifaceted form of exchange in a gift 
economy in which "exchanges and contracts take place in the form of 
presents. "256 
250 Id. 
251 Posner, supra note 18, at 569. 
252 See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
253 See Veblen, supra note 17, at 59 ("Under the mandatory code of decency, the time 
and effort of the members of such a household are required to be ostensibly all spent in a 
performance of conspicuous leisure, in the way of ... charity organisations .... "). 
254 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 98. 
255 See generally FRUMKIN, supra note 21. See also Barman, supra note 20, at 1423-24; 
Mount, supra note 21, at 11-13. 
256 MAUSS, supra note 1, at 3. For a discussion of how gifts-and bribes-have been 
treated in the representation of judicial administration, see JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, 
REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY~STATES AND 
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1. Signaling Status and Social Benefit 
In the gift economy that helps govern charitable trusts and gifts, 
innumerable benefits flow between the donor, the charitable organization, and 
the public. Furthermore, social groups, the institutional community, and the 
public at large often mediate the bestowing of these benefits. Outside of 
preferential tax treatment, donors receive other tangible benefits as well in the 
form of donor recognition gifts and opportunities.257 The tangible benefits a 
donor may receive include naming opportunities, event invitations, social 
introductions, and board positions.258 
Fundraising leaders have learned how to craft a range of giving 
opportunities that bring tangible benefits, such as the naming of buildings or 
lecture halls, inclusion on donor walls, and invitations to black-tie events.259 
Donor relations and stewardship professionals in fundraising offices across the 
country are charged with making sure that donors are recognized in timely and 
gift-appropriate ways-whether it be inviting the donor of an endowed chair at 
a university to lunch with the faculty member who holds the chair, or sending 
letters from students to the donors who fund their scholarships.260 Donors take 
these benefits seriously. As one economist notes, "the form of recognition the 
charity will provide in exchange for the gift is often spelled out in legal 
contracts, and there are even cases where donors have demanded the return of 
donations after their gifts have not been recognized to their satisfaction."261 
DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 38-48 (2011 ). 
257 Charitable organizations cannot provide tangible benefits that exceed a certain 
amount in return for their contributions; otherwise, the benefit will impact the tax-deductible 
status of the gift. See I.R.C. § l 70(f)(8)(B) (2012). The IRS has provided administrative 
guidelines. See Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471 (1990). 
258 Vesterlund, supra note 242, at 573 ("[L]arge contributors may have buildings named 
after them, receive exclusive dinner invites, be invited to have lunch with powerful 
politicians, and so on. In many instances these goods can be acquired only by making 
donations to the charity, and one may view part of the motivation for the donation as a mere 
purchase of the associated 'rewards."'); see also TERESA OD END AHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT 
HOME: GENEROSITY AND SELF-INTEREST AMONG THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITE 34 (1990) 
("Most members of the culture of philanthropy sit on several boards where they have the 
opportunity to meet, influence, and be praised by fellow philanthropists .... "). Charitable 
trust donors, who are more likely to be high-end donors, receive a disproportionate amount 
of benefits such as naming opportunities. Vesterlund, supra note 242, at 573. 
259 At least one scholar argues that naming rights should not be valued at zero for tax 
purposes because the benefit is so significant. See William A. Drennan, Where Generosity 
and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 46 (2011) ("This special 
rule for naming rights [effectively valuing naming rights at zero] creates a significant tax 
revenue shortfall shouldered by all taxpayers generally, and may have pernicious 
consequences in the charitable world."). 
260 See, e.g., PENELOPE BURK, DONOR-CENTERED FUNDRAISING 35-60, 115-36 (2003). 
261 William T. Harbaugh, The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 277, 277 (1998). 
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Apart from these concrete benefits, donors of charitable gifts and trusts also 
receive intangible benefits from their gifts. Charitable gifts perform a signaling 
function and mark the donors as members of a particular, usually high-status, 
social class or group.262 Ostrower argues that "philanthropy and nonprofits 
have a special place within the elite that goes beyond the particular services of 
the organizations."263 That is to say, philanthropic giving is a behavioral norm 
in the culture of the elite, and charitable gifts do more than support a given 
organization-they announce group membership.264 "Through their 
philanthropy, wealthy donors come together with one another and sustain a 
series of organizations that contribute to the social and cultural coherence of 
upper-class life. "265 
The material benefits related to giving are therefore only the beginning. 
"Through charity benefits, board memberships, private events open only to 
large donors, and related mechanisms, elites carve out a separate world for 
themselves through philanthropy."266 Charitable giving buys social status and 
"public prestige."267 Through charitable giving, donors indicate to their peers 
as well as outsiders that they belong to a specific reference group and, 
subsequently, modulate their giving such that it aligns with the norms of their 
reference group. 
The importance of reference groups might explain why fund-raisers often 
emphasize such social activities as parties, dinners, and reunions: these 
strengthen such groups. The importance of relative donations within these 
groups may explain the common practice of having large donors solicit 
contributions from others in their circle. People should presumably 
increase their donations after being told that a member of their group has 
given a large amount, especially after they have just had dinner with 
him.268 
Similarly, the listing of donor names-arranged according to giving 
levels-in annual reports, performance programs, and other fundraising 
publications helps to both establish and police group norms of giving. 
Supporting the signaling value of public donor recognition, one study 
262 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 48. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 36. 
26s Id. 
266 Id. at 48. 
267 William T. Harbaugh, What Do Donations Buy? A Model of Philanthropy Based on 
Prestige and Warm Glow, 67 J. PUB. ECON. 269, 283 (1998). 
268 Harbaugh, supra note 261, at 281. See also FRUMKIN, supra note 21, at 258-59 ("In 
such cases, it is not the needs or demands of beneficiaries that motivate philanthropy, but 
rather the web of social ties that shape individual charitable behavior and the desire of 
individuals to be seen as contributing their fair share."); OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 37 
("Donors themselves freely discussed how they 'use' the desire for prestige as a tool in 
fundraising from their peers."). 
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concludes that, "a consumer is more willing to donate to an organization the 
more likely is the intended audience to hear about that donation .... [T]his is 
understandable to the extent that such fund-raising activities publicize the 
amounts donated by others. Dinners, benefit concerts, and promotional 
literature can fall into this category."269 Scholars have termed especially public 
forms of this behavior "blatant benevolence" and remark that, for all donors, 
this kind of benevolence is "useful for publicizing one's pro social nature."270 
Confirming the importance of norm creation, Eric Posner states, "if people 
care sufficiently about their reputations (for being generous or for being 
wealthy), almost everyone will conform to a norm of gift-giving behavior."271 
In another study, economists found that "[i]f the norms about social behavior 
within the group are violated by some group members not contributing what is 
considered their appropriate share of contributions to the common interest, this 
may induce other members of the group to reconsider .... "272 Donor behavior 
is intimately calibrated to the perceived norms. Charitable gifts exchange 
wealth for status, resources for recognition, and support for belonging. The 
complex of relationships established through charitable giving encompasses 
individuals, institutions, social groups, and the public at large. 
Within th~ target social group, giving also reinforces individual 
relationships. Charitable gifts are tools that individuals can employ in order to 
not only maintain networks of contacts, but also to create added advantage and 
opportunities for themselves and family members. Donors will make a gift or 
join a board because a friend or colleague is involved with a particular 
organization; likewise, a donor may buy a table at an event because a friend is 
receiving an award.273 Donors exploit the charitable gift economy in order to 
build networking opportunities. In fact, one donor in Ostrower's study said, 
"[i]t's an opportunity to meet some people and do some things, which in my 
mind is more networking than anything else."274 Another donor admitted that 
269 Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation/or Charity, 86 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1019, 1024-25 (1996). 
270 Vladas Griskevicius, Joshua M. Tybur, Jill M. Sundie, Robert B. Cialdini, Geoffrey F. 
Miller, & Douglas T. Kenrick, Blatant Benevolence and Conspicuous Consumption: When 
Romantic Motives Elicit Strategic Costly Signals, 93 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 85, 87 
(2007). The authors also suggest that blatant benevolence may serve romantic matching 
purposes. Id. ("A mating motive could either lead both women and men to blatantly display 
benevolence given that helpfulness is a desirable trait to either sex, or it might lead to a 
boost in blatant benevolence only for women."). 
271 Posner, supra note 18, at 576. See also FRUMKIN, supra note 21, at 258 ("[T]he 
decision of how much to give can also be shaped by the norms for the social groups within 
which donors find themselves."). 
272 Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, Self-Enforcing Norms and Efficient Non-
Cooperative Collective Action in the Provision of Public Goods, 146 Pus. CHOICE 501, 517 
(2011). 
273 OsTROWER, supra note 20, at 31-34. 
274 Id. at 37. See also FRUMKIN, supra note 21, at 258 ("Helping may also provide an 
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he agreed to head an alumni fundraising drive partly in order to improve his 
visibility among classmates, "because everybody knows that someone who 
takes on the chairmanship of a class reunion is prepared to give."275 For similar 
reasons, donors make leadership gifts in order to sit on boards, because board 
membership offers "valuable social and business connections."276 
For those individuals seeking entry into an elite social class, charitable 
giving is also a valuable tool. As Ostrower notes, "[p ]restigious nonprofits and 
charity benefits become the target of 'social climbing' and networking. "277 
Making a significant gift to the appropriate nonprofits "serves as a symbol of 
'having arrived' socially."278 As one donor remarked, "[i]f you move to [X] 
and you want to be accepted by the OK people, you break your back to get on 
the board of the museum .... The entrees leading off that board are not to be 
believed."279 Exploring the phenomenon of charitable giving as a means to 
social climbing, economists have studied the utility of a common fundraising 
practice-kicking off a fundraising campaign with the announcement of one or 
more major gifts from high-profile donors.280 The researchers found evidence 
to suggest that "a contribution-maximizing fundraiser will benefit from first 
soliciting donors who have a high social ranking, and then announcing their 
contributions to those of lower ranking."281 Fundraising professionals 
themselves agreed that the "strategy may work because it enables subsequent 
donors to associate with the initial donors, [and] ... enables new money to 
associate with old money."282 The charitable gift economy, therefore, operates 
along various axes of ambition, and exchanges are made for compound 
purposes. 
2. Choosing Causes and Individual Self-Definition 
Charitable giving provides further benefit to the donor by affording the 
donor an opportunity to participate in a project that is personally meaningful 
and that contributes to her individual sense of self-definition. Charitable giving 
allows donors to affiliate with specific groups, institutions, and causes, thereby 
opportunity to expand one's social network and access new social opportunities. By giving, 
donors can buy entree into social groups and communities that have social prestige, political 
power, or business ties."). 
275 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 36. 
276 Id. at 38. 
277 Id. at 37. 
278 Id. See also ODENDAHL, supra note 258, at 40-41 ("[O]nce a newly rich family turns 
to philanthropy, its members have a better chance of being accepted into upper-class 
society."). 
279 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 38. 
28° Cagri S. Kumru & Lise Vesterlund, The Effect of Status on Charitable Giving, 12 
Ass'NFORPUB. ECON. THEORY 709, 725 (2010). 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 726. 
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signaling their tastes, preferences, and ideals to a broad audience. In other 
words, "when it comes to explaining how and why people give, differences are 
rarely a function of differences in financial capital or even moral capital, but 
rather the intensity of associational capital, which takes the form of social 
networks and close identification with causes."283 
Charitable giving is by no means a monolithic endeavor, and within the 
high-prestige world of philanthropy there are numerous opportunities for 
donors to give and partner with worthy organizations. As Ostrower found in 
her study, "[d]onors were often quick to note that there are many worthy 
causes, more than they could possibly support."284 Given the wide range of 
possible objects of charity, and that "[t]he sheer range of possibilities is 
daunting to many donors,"285 it comes as no surprise that "[t]he choice of what 
to support lies at the heart of defining a strategy for giving."286 Indeed, "[a]ll 
philanthropic activity involves a choice about how to join public needs with 
private commitments in a way that is both beneficial for others and satisfying 
for the giver."287 Usha Rodrigues, drawing on social identity theory, has also 
posited that non-profit organizations "sell" identity in a way that for-profit 
corporations cannot, thereby allowing for particularly strong individual identity 
formation through philanthropy.288 
It goes without saying that the "identification that develops between 
individuals and institutions may have various meanings."289 The key is that, in 
most cases, there exists a strong identification between the individual and the 
institution that she chooses to support. Donors "believe they have a right to 
choose the causes they wish to support. Their choices reflect their personal 
interests and concems."29° Choices to affiliate with one organization or cause 
over another are moments of self-definition. The phenomenon of self-
definition through charitable giving is reinforced by the fact that high-level 
philanthropic relationships are "ongoing and longlasting."291 These giving 
283 FRUMKIN, supra note 21, at 259-60 (emphasis omitted). 
284 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 33. 
285 FRUMKIN, supra note 21, at 14 7. 
286 Id. See also Paul G. Schervish, Inclination, Obligation, and Association: What We 
Know and What We Need to Learn About Donor Motivation, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN FUND 
RAISING 137 (Dwight F. Burlingame, ed. 1997) ("[G]enerosity is not a function of income 
but of the personal and social aspects of associational density, inclination, obligation, and 
invitation."). 
287 FRUMKIN, supra note 21, at 148. 
288 Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L. J. 1257, 1283 (2011) ("Nonprofits 
can create and 'sell' a particular kind of identity, one in which an individual may participate 
as employee, donor, or volunteer."). 
289 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 35. 
290 Id. at 130. 
291 Id. at 34. 
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relationships are continuous exchanges that build over the years, cultivated by 
recipient institutions and cemented by the donor's sense of investment. 
Gifts to educational institutions are a common way for individuals to signal 
a specific affiliative identity, as well as family and social history. Individuals 
donate to specific schools and universities in their capacity as alumni or 
because a family member attended the institution.292 Donors also give to 
schools because they met their future spouses, friends, and colleagues during 
their student days.293 In fact, "close associations between families and 
particular schools may lead individual donors to contribute even where their 
own sense of involvement is weak."294 For these reasons, among others, giving 
to educational institutions is a strong norm among high-wealth donors, 
sometimes even capturing "the number-one priority in their charitable 
giving. "295 
Educational giving, however, is not the only outlet for self-definition 
through organizational affiliation. "Whether consciously or not, we can clearly 
see that donors define the boundaries of philanthropy . . . in a way that 
legitimates them in following their own personal preferences."296 
Consequently, donors give to cultural institutions in order to signal their 
appreciation for and understanding of the arts, or in order to be regarded as an 
expert in a certain field. 297 Religious organizations are similarly channels for 
donors to express certain parts of their identities, as are organizations dedicated 
to causes related to environmentalism, gender, and other specific social issues. 
Science funding, for example, has become a newly attractive province for 
major donors who, "from Silicon Valley to Wall Street ... seek to reinvent 
themselves as patrons of social progress through science research."298 In 
addition, health issues are. often very personal ones, and donors often 
contribute significant amounts to particular medical research when a family 
member suffers from the disease in question.299 
292 Id. at 87. 
293 Id. at 88-89 ("While discussing their reasons for making larger gifts to their schools, 
some people also spoke of the enduring, personal relationships they formed as students."). 
See also Rodrigues, supra note 288, at 1306 ("[W]hen universities market to potential 
donors-chiefly alumni-social identity becomes highly important. Few organizations in an 
individual's life shape one's identity as profoundly as one's undergraduate institution."). 
294 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 32. 
295 John J. Havens, Mary A. O'Herlihy & Paul G. Schervish, Charitable Giving: How 
Much, by Whom, to What, and How, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
558 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds., 2006). 
296 OSTROWER, supra note 20, at 131. 
297 Id. at 37. 
298 William J. Broad, Billionaires With Big Ideas Are Privatizing American Science, N. Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2014, at Al. 
299 Devera Pine & Sally McLain, Research Funding: No Longer Just Government 
Dollars, 17 P&S J. (1997), 
http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/psjournal/archive/archives/jour _ v l 7n2 _ 0020.html 
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By creating private foundations, donors seek to clarify their personal 
identity and vision through what one scholar has called "strategic giving"300_ 
individuals leveraging charitable giving "to enact their private visions of the 
public good."301 Usha Rodrigues has suggested that "[f]oundations are in a 
sense the epitome of nonprofits serving an identity function,"302 and that there 
is a "specific kind of prestige associated with creating a nonprofit that fulfills 
the founders' goals."303 Even working with preexisting institutions, as 
sophisticated consumers, "donors have increasingly defined giving styles and 
engagement strategies that call for close collaboration between themselves and 
nonprofit organizations."304 Accordingly, donors approach their charitable 
giving through the lens of a pre-set "philanthropic agenda" that is based on 
personal considerations.305 Susan Ostrander, describing trends toward 
increased donor control in gifting, has observed: "The term social entrepreneur 
is now often used as a substitute for the term philanthropist, and it typifies the 
authoritative and directive stance of high donor control where donors develop 
and carry out their own personal social visions through their philanthropy."306 
Whether or not donors see themselves as social entrepreneurs, they 
nonetheless view charitable giving-and the restrictions that they place on 
gifts-as an opportunity to create a unique imprint on the world around them. 
Gifts are, in this light, markers not just of status but also of personality. Gifts 
help donors to craft a public persona, just as they can facilitate individual self-
actualization. And in either--0r both-cases, these multiple modes of 
interaction and association between donors and their charitable projects 
underscore the idea that the donor derives great benefit, in terms of personal 
satisfaction as well as self-definition, through giving. 
[http://perma.cc/T62Z-LPG7] ("In other cases, donors are motivated when they, family 
members, or close friends are touched in a dramatic way by a disease or condition that needs 
to be researched and eradicated. 'In general, people give money for research because it hits 
an emotional spot."'). See also Broad, supra note 298 (describing major gifts to medical 
research by donors who have experienced personal or family trauma and are seeking 
medical advancement). 
30° FRUMKJN, supra note 21, at 136. 
301 Id. 
302 Rodrigues, supra note 288, at 1303. 
303 Id. 
304 FRUMKIN, supra note 21, at 265. 
305 Susan A. Ostrander, The Growth of Donor Control: Revisiting the Social Relations of 
Philanthropy, 36 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 356, 361 (2007). John Eason has 
speculated that this type of "entrepreneurial" giving may in fact increase the number of 
donors who place restrictions on their gifts. See John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life 
Cycle, or What Comes Around Goes Around, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693, 704 (2007) ("This 
trend [imposing specific terms and conditions upon gifts] is in part attributable to the 
growing number of entrepreneurial donors who are confident in both their views and their 
ability to effectively guide an organization towards its mission."). 
306 Ostrander, supra note 305, at 362. 
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3. Feeling the "Warm Glow" 
Behavioralists, in economics and other social sciences, have also done 
research on "warm glow"-their term for the personal pleasure that donors 
experience as a result of their own charitable giving.307 From this perspective, 
donors give not because of concern for their public personae but because 
giving makes them feel good about themselves.308 Susan Rose Ackerman has 
observed that: "One explanation for giving is that donors benefit from the act 
of giving itself .... Donors may value not only the benefits supplied by the 
organization, but also their own acts of charity."309 Likewise, economists 
recognize: "To better explain charitable giving it has been argued that ... there 
are many benefits that only the contributor experiences."310 
In attempting to explain why people give, especially to charitable causes, 
economists have concluded that one strong factor for charitable giving is 
"warm glow."311 Economists define warm glow as "the sense of agency 
associated with the act of voluntary giving"312 and classify it as one motive, 
among others, for charitable giving. Economists generally believe that donors 
fall somewhere on a spectrum between pure altruism and pure egoism, and that 
their giving is motivated by a complicated combination of factors: "[c]learly 
social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or simply a desire for a 'warm glow' may play 
important roles in the decisions of agents."313 The middle area of the spectrum 
is home to what economists call "impure altruism."314 That is, "Considerable 
evidence exists indicating that givers are neither pure altruists nor pure egoists. 
Rather, the evidence suggests that givers are impure altruists, motivated by 
both altruism and warm glow."315 
307 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits and Economic Theory, 34 J. OF 
ECON. LITERATURE 701, 712-13, (1996). 
308 Id. at 712. 
309 Id. 
3w Vesterlund, supra note 242, at 572. 
311 See generally James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A 
Theory of Warm-Glow, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990) [hereinafter Andreoni, Impure Altruism]; 
James Andreoni, Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of 
Altruism, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 57 (1988) (discussing the limitations of viewing altruism as the 
sole motive for charitable giving); Harbaugh, supra note 267 (arguing that the desire for 
prestige and feelings of wann glow motivate giving). 
312 William T. Harbaugh, Ulrich Mayr, & Daniel R. Burghart, Neural Responses to 
Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, 316 SCIENCE 
1622, 1622 (2007). 
313 Andreoni, Impure Altruism, supra note 311, at 464. 
314 Id. at 468 ("Impure altruism ... assumes that people are not indifferent between these 
alternatives: all else equal, they prefer the bundle with the most wann glow."). 
315 Heidi Crumpler & Philip J. Grossman, An Experimental Test of Warm Glow Giving, 
92 J. PUB. ECON. 1011, 1012 (2008). 
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Studies of impure altruism predict that, "[g]iven the choice, people are 
assumed to prefer to give directly, that is, they prefer the bundle with the most 
warm glow."316 Certain subsequent game experiments have demonstrated that 
warm glow is a determinative factor in charitable giving: "Our results suggest 
that warm glow giving exists and is significant. Furthermore, when we 
compare our findings to those of other studies that examined charitable giving 
without separating warm glow from altruistic giving, the results suggest that 
warm glow motivates a substantial proportion of all giving."317 Studies of 
neural responses have similarly indicated that the "[s]ubjective satisfaction [of 
the study participant] increased as transfers increased and costs decreased and 
was higher in the voluntary. . . than in the mandatory conditions."318 
Approaching the question of warm glow from an organizational perspective, 
another scholar has suggested that the particularities of the nonprofit form is 
"bound up with warm glow"319 in a way that other corporate forms cannot 
recreate. 
None of this is to suggest that altruism plays no part in charitable giving. 
What is nevertheless evident from this analysis of the myriad motives for 
charitable giving is that altruism is impure at best. Moreover, it is clear that 
considerations of status, social identity, and personal satisfaction weigh heavily 
· in a donor's decision to make a charitable gift and, in particular, where and 
how to direct a gift. 
C. Aligning Cy Pres Reform with the Charitable Gift Economy 
Donors receive a robust set of benefits that encourages us to reconceive the 
transaction between donor and institution based on a more complete 
understanding of the extended gift economy in which charitable giving takes 
place. The charitable gift economy is an elaborate economy organized around 
personal favors, social norms, institutional access, public prestige, and elite 
status. We must recalibrate how we think of the charitable giving accordingly. 
Cy pres reform and the liberalization of cy pres doctrine harmonizes with 
this recalibrated understanding of charitable giving as squarely situated in a 
complex gift economy. From this perspective, cy pres reform is based on the 
idea that donors receive sufficient benefits during their lifetimes such that 
perpetual adherence to donor intent is neither necessary nor appropriate. That 
is to say, perpetual adherence to donor intent is no longer the only, or even the 
primary, benefit that flows to donors. Historically, this privileging of donor 
316 Andreoni, Impure Altruism, supra note 311, at 470. 
317 Crumpler & Grossman, supra note 315, at 1018. See also Thomas R. Palfrey & 
Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and 
Why?, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 829, 842 (1997) ("We found that altruism played little or no role 
at all in the individual's decision and, on the other hand, warm-glow effects and random 
error played both important and significant roles."). 
3IS Harbaugh et al., supra note 312, at 1623. 
319 Rodrigues, supra note 288, at 1288. 
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intent may have been more appropriate than it is today. However, with the 
recognition, not only of the tax advantages, but also of the wealth of social and 
psychological benefits donors receive, there is ample reason to discount the 
controlling value of donor intent. The doctrinal changes and reforms discussed 
in the cases in Part II are therefore not only normatively desirable but also 
theoretically sound. 
In fact, based on this understanding of the charitable gift economy, further 
reform may be appropriate. In this vein, I propose an additional reform-that 
donor control be time-limited in order to reflect and properly weigh the 
presence of major donor benefits. The real question, in this new economy, is 
how much benefit the donor receives for her charitable giving. As the value of 
the lifetime benefits increase, the sway of donor intent after a donor's death 
should decrease. A theoretically accurate way to go about answering this 
question-one which I do not propose here-would be for courts to analyze 
exactly what benefits a donor received in order to better understand how much 
weight donor intention should receive. Courts could examine whether the 
donor received naming rights, participated on a board as a result of a gift, 
established new institutional relationships, or otherwise benefitted from the 
gift. This approach, however, would be difficult to realize. These kinds of fact-
sensitive inquiries into the benefits the donor received would be exceedingly 
burdensome for courts. Furthermore, these inquiries would require the almost 
impossible quantification of numerous intangibles. How, for example, would a 
court calculate the value of any reputational enhancement, prestige value, or 
personal satisfaction received from making a charitable gift? 
An alternate approach, one that would be easier to implement, would be to 
set time limits on donor control of a restricted gift. Time limits help courts 
avoid difficult questions about the valuation of benefits while still 
acknowledging the force of the charitable gift economy. Time limits, 
especially those indexed to the death of the donor, operate on the 
understanding that numerous donor benefits accrue to the donor during her 
lifetime, when the donor has the opportunity to enjoy them. Consequently, 
because the donor has enjoyed the rewards of charitable giving while alive, 
after her death the benefit of the gift should shift to the institution and larger 
community that the gift is meant to support. A time-based approach recognizes 
that, "[a]s the warm glow that originally accompanied a donor's charitable gift 
begins to fade with time, however, the circumstances and opportunities for 
public benefit that framed that gift also inevitably evolve."320 Moreover, Rob 
Atkinson has stated: "The moral force of commitments may also diminish over 
time .... Beyond a point, the value to a donor (charitable or otherwise) of 
controlling the future probably diminishes to the verge ofvanishing."321 
Previous proposals for reform have explicitly called for time limits of 
various kinds. Lewis Simes, in his seminal 1955 lectures about "Public Policy 
320 Eason, supra note 114, at 124. 
321 Atkinson, supra note 12, at 1132. 
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and the Dead Hand," proposed that "[a]fter the expiration of a fixed time, say 
thirty years, or earlier with the approval of the trustees and of the donor, if 
living, a broadened cy pres should be applicable."322 At the end of the thirty 
years, courts would presume general charitable intent and interpret restrictions 
broadly.323 Alex Johnson has proposed a revivification of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities in order to limit the duration of donor restrictions on gifts.324 
While the charitable trust could exist in perpetuity, the restrictions would be 
subject to the time limitations embodied by the Rule Against Perpetuities.325 
After the expiration of the time period, the assets in the trust would be 
"delivered to an entity for disposition, and that entity will have power to 
dispose of the assets without any compliance or adherence to the settlor's 
wishes. "326 
Iris Goodwin, in her discussion of the Princeton case, has also noted the 
importance of time periods.327 She has suggested that "[t]he administration of a 
restricted gift should be governed by a succession of 'Program Periods'. .. [of] 
a length sufficient to allow the charity to steward the grant with a degree of 
autonomy and also to gather evidence demonstrating the feasibility of the 
stipulated mission given present circumstances."328 Goodwin recommends that 
fifteen years might be an appropriate "program period," and that during the 
first period "the charity would be required to adhere to the strict terms of the 
grant."329 After that period, the charity would be allowed to proceed with 
greater latitude in interpreting gift restrictions. 330 These administrative 
procedures would help "address the burdens of time."331 Similarly, John Eason 
has written about the "restricted gift life cycle," adverting to the idea that the 
obligations that accompany the management of restricted gifts change over 
time.332 
322 Simes, supra note 15, at 139. 
323 Id. ("Under this doctrine a general charitable purpose need not be found. It would 
always be implied in law that the gift was 'for charity."'). 
324 See Johnson, supra note 187, at 383-84 ("The operation of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities insures that, at least with respect to non-charitable trusts, the settlor's wishes 
will be adhered to, and to the letter, for a limited period of time."). 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 See Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can Do For You: Robertson v. 
Princeton Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 
ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 123 (2009). 
32s Id. 
329 Id. 
330 See id. 
331 Id. 
332 Eason, supra note 305, at 697 ("[C]onsiderations bearing upon the donor-recipient 
relationship at any given time will acquire added significance as the seemingly isolated 
actions inspired by those considerations reverberate throughout the period spanning from 
inception of the gift to its potential restructuring over time."). 
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Building on these proposals, I suggest a similar kind of timeline. To begin, 
donor restrictions should be supported during the donor's lifetime. Donors 
should be able to enjoy the benefits that accrue to them while they are alive 
and still able to appreciate the full extent of any social and psychological 
aftereffects of giving. Moreover, requests to change gift restrictions due to 
changed circumstances could be addressed in consultation with the donor. In 
these cases, cy pres would not even be necessary. In cases where 
communication with the donor was not possible, courts could evaluate cy pres 
petitions according to the reformed standards discussed previously. That is to 
say, a court engaging in cy pres analysis wouldbroadly interpret the 
requirement that the terms be "illegal, impractical, impossible or wasteful" and 
presume a general charitable intent. 
The death of the donor would be a touchstone event and mark a bright line 
with respect to donor conditions. I would, in fact, suggest that this event should 
all but extinguish the need for judicial adherence to donor restrictions. The 
donor, up until that point, will have received the full benefit of her gift; after 
that point, the benefit should flow, accordingly, to the institution and the 
public. Thanks to her gift, the donor has benefitted tax-wise, through the 
acquisition of social status, and by generating feelings of self-satisfaction. 
Upon her death, the balance should shift and courts should consider the public 
benefit rather than the donor's benefit. 
In concrete terms, this would mean an even more liberalized cy pres 
procedure. Doctrinal modification could entail creating a presumption that gift 
restrictions, in this context, met the criteria of "illegal, impractical, impossible 
or wasteful." Alternately, reform might entail dropping that requirement 
altogether, akin to deviation. Further amendments to the doctrine might also 
entail dropping the requirement of general charitable intent out of judicial 
analysis so that courts would not be required to address this question and the 
parties would not be required to expend resources trying to prove or disprove 
general charitable intent. The most radical reform would be to eliminate the 
need for either cy pres or deviation petitions and allow trustees and directors to 
spend the gift money according to institutional need without any judicial 
intervention. This last type of reform would be most appropriate after the 
passage of a certain time period, such as fifty years, when the donor's spouse 
and immediate family would likely no longer be alive as well. 
To be sure, there are drawbacks to such a timeline and such reform. The 
most salient critique is that such a decrease in adherence to donor intent will 
lead to a related decrease in charitable giving. Commentators fear that 
"disregarding donor intent will have an adverse effect on charitable giving; 
once donors know their intentions can be disregarded without legal penalty, 
they will be less inclined to give."333 Moreover, commentators have speculated 
333 Atkinson, supra note 12, at 1121. Responding to this point, John Simon remarked in 
relation to the Buck Trust challenge, "past experience points away from a chilling effect on 
gifts." In fact, Simon noted, "giving in England actually increased following cy pres 
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that by failing to uphold donor terms and intent, courts may remove incentives 
not only to philanthropy, but also to productivity.334 It is more likely, however, 
that the myriad benefits that donors receive during their lifetime-including a 
range of financial, social, and psychological benefits-make giving an 
attractive proposition even in the absence of perpetual adherence to the donor's 
conditions. Charitable giving is an estate planning strategy, a social norm, a 
tool for shaping personal identity, and a moment of pleasure. The force of 
these tokens of the charitable gift economy overrides any danger associated 
with the removal of one particular motivation to give. 
CONCLUSION 
When Chief Justice Marshall wrote, almost two centuries ago, that "one 
great inducement to these gifts is the conviction felt by the giver, that the 
disposition he makes of them is immutable,"335 the philanthropic landscape 
differed significantly from the modem one. Donors did not make charitable 
gifts as part of a larger strategy to minimize tax burdens or engage in estate 
planning. Donors were not wooed by sophisticated fundraising professionals 
with a full menu of donor benefits and donor recognition mechanisms. 
Moreover, donors were not rewarded to the same degree that they are now with 
board memberships, leadership volunteer opportunities, or strategic 
institutional partnerships. Donor intent, consequently, predominated as both 
the inducement and reward for charitable giving. 
More recently, cy pres reform has slowly but steadily chipped away at the 
primacy of donor intent and made it easier for institutions to reform restricted 
gifts through judicial intervention. Changes adopted by the Uniform Trust 
Code, the Restatement, and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional 
Funds Act have modernized cy pres procedure by shifting the presumption in 
favor of genera) charitable intent, adding "wasteful" as a criterion, and blurring 
the line between cy pres and deviation. These reforms represent positive 
change. What has been missing, however, is a theory based on the intrinsic 
qualities of charitable gifts to fully support these and future reforms. 
Scholars have made inroads on this question by emphasizing the preferential 
tax treatment that donors receive and how these benefits should shape our 
understanding of charitable property. Nevertheless, until we understand 
charitable giving as embedded and operational within a gift economy, fueled 
by social exchanges and regulated by cultural norms, we will not be able to get 
at the true extent of benefits flowing to donors. More specifically, we will not 
recognize the significant intangible benefits donors receive in exchange for 
developments that were much more unsettling to donors than any message the Buck Trust 
case could send." Simon, supra note 167, at 662-63. 
334 Macey, supra note 109, at 297 ("[R]egulating how a settlor can dispose of his wealth 
may lead to inefficiencies because such interference would decrease the incentives to 
accumulate wealth."). 
335 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 647 (1819). 
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their charitable gifts, including increased social prestige, opportunities for 
social identity creation, and a strong sense of self-satisfaction. Adopting the 
charitable gift economy concept into our understanding of trust principles will 
promote a more modem and nuanced legal view of both philanthropy and 
charitable gifts. The concept of the charitable gift economy helps us to better 
imagine the nature and intrinsic value of charitable gifts by uncovering the 
multiple meanings that constitute gift property. Working on this understanding 
of charitable giving, courts will be equipped to both support cy pres reform and 
recalibrate the balance between donor and public benefit. 
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